Author: Deborah Welch Larson
Affiliation: University of California, Los Angeles
Organization/Publisher: The Chinese Journal of International Politics
Date/Place: February 27, 2020/UK
Type of Literature: Journal Article
Number of Pages: 24
Link: https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/2/163/5762630
Keywords: China, Proactive Leadership, Human Authority, Moral Realism, and International System
Brief:
In this study, the author provides a review of the recent book published by the famous Chinese academic Yan Xuetong, “Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers” (2020), focusing on the issue of the rise of China, the nature of this rise, its impacts on the international system, and most importantly the extent to which China can undertake a moral leadership role different from the dominant role Western powers have had in history. Yan assumes that if a rising China has an effective reform-minded leadership at a time when the dominant power does not, that the rising power will surpass the dominant one in terms of overall capabilities; but that will not be available unless China can attract followers convincing them that the leading country is a benign and just power, which requires formulation and defense of an ideology that attracts other cultures—this is what Yan calls “humane authority,” which differs from coercive hegemony. With the relative decline of the US’ global support for liberalism, as well as the geopolitical vacuum left by Trump’s decision to withdraw from international agreements, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, China has an opportunity to fill this vacuum, so Beijing must continuously pursue moral values in all of its domestic policies and international relations. This is a necessary demand for moral leadership. The author’s study is divided into five main parts. The first part represents a theoretical framework adopted by the Yan book or what he calls “Moral Realism,” influenced by classical realism, in which the author emphasizes “strategic credibility” as the most important characteristic of international moral leadership (the fulfillment of promises and commitments towards friends and rivals and building trust); its aim is for follower states to willingly implement the leadership’s desires voluntarily, trying here to evoke the Chinese concept of power (Quanwei) which means “prestige and popular trust,” and which differs from the Western concept of “Power” based on the implicit threat to use force. Depending on the old Chinese thought, Yan coined the term “humane authority,” which he considers the highest form of international leadership given its ability to spread credibility and confidence among both followers and subordinates, and the effect it creates by devoting beneficial interactions between them instead of threat and coercion. Yan refers to President Roosevelt’s behavior during World War II when he decided to provide voluntary support to the allies and then contributed strongly to the establishment of the UN as a historical example from the West of what he meant by “The Benevolent Leadership.” The second part of the study details the issue of internal leadership and how this leadership makes the position of great powers. Yan argues that China surpasses the US in “the quality of local leadership.” His focus on the quality of leadership emphasizes the importance of human choice and the ability of leaders to shape opportunities for peace or war, thus undermining the structural predictions (which structural realists adopt) of the inevitable conflict between the two powers. After identifying the leadership patterns of the emerging powers, the author argues that China has “proactive leadership.” This pattern aims to improve the status of the state through political means by implementing local reforms that increase its power, pointing to a set of practical evidence that proves this view, such as “the greatest Chinese dream” project and the “great revival of the Chinese nation” announced by leader Xi Jinping in 2012. According to the author, the proactive leadership of China seeks to enhance the country’s international position by expanding its circle of supporters, providing support and protection for them; this is what China is doing by establishing regional and international institutions similar to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIBA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization through which it aims to obtain admission to the Great Power Club. It is an intelligent mechanism that does not require absolute compliance with the prevailing international “Western” standards, it maintains the moral character of China’s leadership, and it does not demonstrate China as a rising power that wants to overthrow the existing system in return. The third and fourth parts discuss the issue of alliances and the Chinese-American rivalry. China has historically been opposed to the issue of establishing military alliances as it carries the Cold War mentality and enhances the possibility of tensions and wars; in contrast, it prefers to focus on building a network of strategic partnerships, relying on its growing economic capacities. By July 2019, China had formally signed strategic partnerships with 110 countries and regional organizations. This approach helps China create a multipolar cooperative environment favorable to it and against the coercive American liberal hegemony. Through a strategic partnership mechanism instead of alliances, Beijing delivers a message to the world and neighboring countries that relations among nations should not be affected by differences in values, institutions, the form of governments or social systems, as each country is allowed to set its development path and its own social and political systems away from any external interference. Here, the author considers Russia as the most likely candidate to engage in this type of strategic partnership that China advocates despite the differences between the two countries. In his definition of Sino-American competition, Yan argues that it is unlikely to repeat the Cold War scenario between them in the American-Soviet way, because the conditions of the Cold War are absent in the China-US case: the differences between them do not revolve around ideological issues, nuclear weapons help prevent a military conflict between them, the internet and computers encourage technological innovations and transfer competition to cyberspace to the extent that neither country has incentives to conquer the lands of others, the two powers interact today intensively and more broadly compared to the state of the US and the Soviet Union, which reduces mistrust between them and provides positive incentives to establish good relations; current trade also promotes economic interdependence between them and makes military war and disengagement unreasonable, costly, and harmful to the whole world. Nevertheless, the author believes that if there is “a new cold war” between the two powers, its main sphere will be competition over status (which is primarily made by the economic field and technological innovation), rather than military power. The author accordingly calls on both countries to “de-securitize” and “de-militarize” the technological innovation, the dual-use of which may prompt a deadly clash. In the last part, the study sheds light on the contribution of Yan’s book in the literature on “the transfer of power” in which he rejects Western theories based on the factor of war as the main factor of transition, given to his focus on the leadership factor which can make the transition more flexible. Both Yan and the article’s author call upon the two great powers for pre-thinking how to exercise joint international leadership as the most rational and beneficial option for both the US and China in the long run.
By: Djallel Khechib, CIGA Senior Research Associate
