Author: Paul D. Miller
Affiliation: Georgetown University
Organization/Publisher: Atlantic Council
Date/Place: February 6, 2020, U.S.
Type of Literature: Report
Number of Pages: 36
Keywords: Withdrawal deadline, Public perception, United States
Brief:
The report discusses the US withdrawal scenarios from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan comparatively, along with the corresponding public perceptions and the political and military goals achieved. The author argues that the circumstances of the United States’ withdrawals from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan vary considerably, as do the timetables attached to each. Supposedly, there were no timetables attached with Vietnam but in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan a timetable was announced. Despite these differences, an overriding commonality stands out: the timetables for withdrawal did not gain the benefits for which the US policymakers hoped, but instead incurred the costs policymakers feared. The withdrawal timetable is a way to sustain public support for military operations, but it appears to be an ineffective means to that end because reducing the number of deployed troops may well raise as many problems as it solves. The author is pessimistic that in any case, withdrawal did not increase the US leverage over its ally, as policymakers—especially Obama—clearly hoped. Withdrawal did not help the United States compel the Vietnamese, Iraqi, or Afghan governments or security forces to reform or improve their competence. The report concludes that withdrawal deadlines do not appreciably sustain public support for military operations, but instead harm policymakers’ reputations and undermine the effectiveness of military operations.
By: RaziaWadood, CIGA Senior Research Associate
