Türkiye & The MENA Region (EUISS’s Türkiye’s Cards in the World -Chapter 3)

Brief:

This chapter quantifies Türkiye’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, focusing on four key areas: economy and trade, foreign policy, humanitarian aid, and education. In outlining these four key areas, the chapter highlights a number of noteworthy figures and parameters.

The chapter focuses on portraying Türkiye and its increasingly growing role as a “snapshot” of a region in flux with changing alliances and rivalries, as it shows how Türkiye is navigating the various regional issues and challenges present today. From another standpoint, the chapter stresses that Türkiye’s assessment of the regional opportunities and challenges reflect its issues, most prominently economic anxieties, political stability, and the refugee issue. Finally, the chapter emphasizes that Türkiye’s regional efforts, if successful, can make for a more constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the EU, especially as regards the situation in the East Mediterranean. Conversely, it might also raise security concerns and hinder dialogue with the EU should the security situation in the East Mediterranean grow more volatile.

The article stresses that Türkiye views the Middle East as a paramount priority, best evidenced by the fact that the Global Diplomacy Index of 2024 ranks Ankara as the third most active diplomatic player globally behind China and the US, with many of its newly established diplomatic missions located in the MENA region. As such, how Türkiye navigates its foothold in the region might shape the trajectory of the region as a whole.

As Ankara tries to diversify its strategic strengths, trade in the MENA region has become a key driver for Türkiye’s economic development, particularly with the Arab World. Türkiye’s exports to the Arab World have grown from $9 billion in 2005 to $46 in 2002. In North Africa, Algeria and Egypt are Türkiye’s most important trading partners and serve as gateways to the wider African market. Türkiye’s focus on Algeria is particularly noteworthy, with Erdogan visiting the country seven times between 2005 and 2023. This has led to Türkiye surpassing France as the leading foreign investor in Algeria outside the hydrocarbon sector, and succeeding in reaching its $5 billion investment target with the country. In turn, Algeria is Türkiye’s fourth-largest gas supplier. Nonetheless, the situation with Egypt has been more complicated due to political differences. Yet, economic pragmatism has prevailed, with trade increasing steadily, accelerating in early 2021 due to internal challenges in both countries. Türkiye has diversified its solutions for gas needs, with Egypt’s LNG offering a lucrative opportunity. Both countries are undergoing transformations to align with the EU green deal, and Türkiye expects to welcome one million Egyptian tourists annually within the next five years.

Similarly, relations between Ankara and the Gulf had soured due to the Khashoggi assassination and Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as allegations of UAE involvement in the 2016 failed coup. However, economic anxieties and the need for political stability through external support have driven the mending of ties. Combined, Qatar and the UAE have injected $20 billion through currency swap deals, while Saudi Arabia followed with a $5 billion deposit into Türkiye’s central bank. On a more bilateral level, while Qatar remains Ankara’s most valuable trading partner, there have been significant progress with both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, which involved trade pacts and the Development Road Project signed with Qatar, Iraq, and the UAE to build a rail and road network connecting Iraq and Europe through Türkiye. Moreover, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are looking to raise their bilateral trade volume to $10 billion up from $6.8 billion in 2023.

Türkiye’s political landscape seems more complex. Türkiye’s involvement in Syria and Libya is viewed as problematic by several regional players. Syria, for instance, poses two major issues for Ankara. First, the refugee issue, with Türkiye hosting about 3.6 million Syrian refugees, which places a significant strain on the country’s resources and infrastructure. Second is the security threat posed by the PKK. To address this, Türkiye has shifted its goals from ousting Assad to containing Kurdish ambitions. Despite aligning more closely with the EU’s position on refusing to reengage with Assad, recent regional rapprochements may open new channels for dialogue with Syria. Meanwhile, Algeria has significant stakes in Libya due to its 1,000 km shared border and leans towards the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). Nonetheless, Algeria opposes Türkiye’s military involvement in Libya. Relations with Egypt remain fragile, burdened by historical tensions and disagreements over the Muslim Brotherhood. Türkiye’s previous support for factions in Libya led to its exclusion from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. However, recent challenges have created room for rapprochement, particularly in responding to humanitarian needs in Gaza.

The Eastern Mediterranean is strategically important for Türkiye under the Blue Homeland doctrine, which views the Aegean, Black Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean as a unified maritime space critical to its security and economic prosperity. Tensions rose in 2019 when Türkiye conducted drilling activities around Cyprus. Türkiye also signed a MoU with the Tripoli-based government, which was heavily favorable to Ankara, a move condemned by the EU. Egypt and Türkiye are cautiously converging, both aiming to avoid military confrontation and seeking a UN-led political process in Libya, despite their diverging long-term goals on the issue.

In the Gulf, Türkiye’s strongest partnership is with Qatar, where it maintains a military base. This relationship is mutually beneficial, with Türkiye’s military strength shielding Qatar from Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s pressure, thus providing Qatar with more room for foreign maneuvering. In return, Qatar’s support enhances Türkiye’s image in the Muslim world and bolsters its regional influence. This partnership is expected to remain strong, with increased Qatari investments in Türkiye and expanded Turkish economic and social projects in Qatar. Türkiye and the UAE are exploring potential defense relationships, with the UAE expressing interest in acquiring TB2 drones. Reports suggest that the UAE has purchased 120 drones, with 20 delivered in November 2023. However, there are contentions regarding Türkiye’s positions in Syria, Iraq, and Sudan. Similarly, defense ties with Saudi Arabia are also developing. In 2022, Saudi Arabia purchased 46 Karayel armed UAVs and agreed to buy more drones in 2023. The exact value of this deal is unknown, but it is touted as the largest defense and aviation export agreement in Turkish history by Baykar’s CEO.

Türkiye is a major player in humanitarian aid within the MENA region, standing out as the largest donor in the world in terms of per capita humanitarian spending relative to national income. Cultural and religious ties significantly influence Türkiye’s humanitarian role, with aid distribution often correlating with historical connections to the Ottoman Empire. During the pandemic, countries with such ties received five times more aid, and Turkic-speaking nations received twice as much aid as other Muslim nations, which underscores the salience of cultural and religious factors in shaping Türkiye’s humanitarian efforts. Türkiye’s humanitarian aid focuses on three main areas: emergency assistance and medical relief, infrastructure development, and investment in social and human capital. Drawing on its advancements in the health sector, Türkiye has become a major health hub. Indeed, Türkiye also emerged as a significant player in pandemic diplomacy during the coronavirus crisis.

Since October 7, Türkiye has intensified its humanitarian efforts in Gaza. Various institutions have been actively involved. These organizations have launched cash donation campaigns, established field hospitals, deployed Turkish health practitioners, and provided essential supplies such as food packages, hot meals, water, baby and child items, hygiene kits, and blankets. The Humanitarian Relief Foundation, or IHH, which has an office in Gaza, leads one of the largest operations to deliver aid to the region.

However, the February 6 earthquakes highlighted vulnerabilities in Türkiye’s disaster management, contrasting starkly with its robust international efforts. Limited resources, weak infrastructure, political instability, and lack of cross-sector coordination are major contributing factors to these challenges.

Another aspect of Ankara’s soft power is education, with a particular focus on the MENA region. Today, Türkiye ranks 10^th globally, hosting 301,694 students during the 2021-2022 academic year. This prominence is partly due to its integration into the European education system through the Bologna Process and programs like Erasmus, Marie Curie, and Socrates. Additionally, Türkiye runs its own academic exchange initiative, Turkiye Burslari (Turkey scholarships Program) and the Mevlana Exchange Program. Syrian students in particular, who are the largest recipients of scholarships out of any other nationality, have received sizable assistance from Türkiye. While Türkiye has seen a rise in Arab students, Europe remains a preferred destination for many, particularly those from North African countries, who often choose France. Like its pandemic aid, Türkiye prioritizes Turkish-speaking and Muslim countries in its scholarship programs, offering 4,316 scholarships in 2022, with 15% going to MENA countries, ranking behind Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Türkiye focuses on restoring Ottoman heritage abroad, such as in Iraq and Tripoli, enhancing its cultural diplomacy.

By: Hamza Ghadban, CIGA Research Intern