Author: Jacob Ross Nicolas Téterchen
Organization/Publisher: DGAP, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik
Original Language: German
Date/Place: June 5, 2024/Germany
Type of Literature: Policy Paper
Word Count: 2306
Link: https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/die-anti-macrons
Keywords: France, Germany, European Union, Geopolitics, Nationalism
Summary:
European Parliament elections took place on June 9th within the context of growing international crises. The European Union’s (EU) economic decline and loss of political significance were topics of discussion given the growing existential threats, the like of which it has not faced since the Cold War. Climate change and mass immigration were two important topics. Both issues however found common ground in the invasion of Ukraine, which has certainly put more strain on the environment and intensified mass migration, as well as increasing the possibility of a nuclear threat. These issues were the main themes influencing the elections in all European Union states and will therefore shape the direction the EU will take looking forward. Interestingly, the results seem to demonstrate a universal shift towards support for far-right parties. This is especially visible in Italy in which the right with Georgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia have transitioned into potential policymakers, courted by the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The same is also true in the Netherlands where Geert Wilders recently succeeded, after many years, in forming a government that depends on his support.
In France, the trend also follows suit. Since 2017, the ‘neither right nor left’ liberal president Macron has acted as an optimistic visionary for the EU and has advocated throughout his 7 years in office for greater European Sovereignty. He has recently offered stern warnings on the issue. The second speech given in Sorbonne during the end of April was intended as a wake-up call and a reminder that “European civilization” is “mortal”. These and other warnings stem from the perception that the EU is overwhelmed by global politics with no coherent deepening of any political identity or structure of the union itself, which is deeply in need of reform. The policy of growing and forming a unique and greater sovereignty for the EU was seen as an effective tool in context of the Russian threat and any crises to come. This policy however has not received any significant reaction from the larger European states and risks failure due to the discord among the 27 member-states. Macron’s urgency, meanwhile, stems from his domestic policies and his position of being without a parliamentary majority of his own, relying instead on the opposition. Especially the RN, the largest opposition faction, has chased Macron and his party towards a center right position. While Macron’s promise to overcome the Left-Right division in France has been significantly fulfilled according to some critics, new election results show a clear steering towards the right. We have to, however, be mindful of France’ unique circumstances and the exact meaning of these opposing factions. Historian Rene Raymond distinguishes between three major currents of the French Right in the 19th century: The Ultras who emerged as a reactionary group and aimed at the restoration of the Monarchy, The Orleanists who wanted to strike a balance between Monarchy and Republic and the Bonapartists who following Bonaparte adopted a nationalist mindset. Raymond’s classification is still widely used but has been altered to allow for the modern political sphere, replacing traditional Left-Right wing clashes with two contesting rightwing parties: the RN and Macron’s Renaissance. Historian Gilles Richard, meanwhile, argues that a much more accurate way of analyzing French politics is to view it as a contestation over national identity, rather than social issues.
These issues also dominate the current French European Elections within the framework of how European states should relate to the European Union. Indeed, this issue is heating up faster than the domestic doctrines which are also discussed. The RN and the R! both belong to a nationalist leaning Right and have similar outlooks, and both argue for France’s sovereignty which they argue Macron is compromising, claiming that Brussels and Berlin dominate the European lobby. They both also cite issues of uncontrollable immigration, economics and social policy. Both fundamentally oppose Macron’s rule and the ‘superstate’ and call the election a ‘return to the voice of the people’. There is a notable difference in positions though, as the R! is positioned to the right of the RN and is perceived to be isolated with minimal influence on national legislation. On the EU level, this perception is reversed due to their affiliations with different party families: While ID, the RN’s group which until recently also included Alternative for Germany, AfD, is isolated and considered extremist, the ECR group to which R! belongs is seen as a potential kingmaker for the next EU Commission. Thanks to the presence of Georgia Meloni and her Fratelli D’Italia, who are expected to significantly increase their seats in the June 9 election, the ECR group is being courted by current Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the European People’s Party (EPP) group. Their goal is to secure votes for von der Leyen’s second term in office. A second important difference is their alliances within the European Union, as the RN chooses the national debate as its framework and rarely ever mentions other EU states. On the contrary, it remains distant from potential partners, especially the AfD, focusing instead on Macron and his wish to transform the EU into a centralized state. Meanwhile, R! takes the struggle for European Civilization as a core policy and finds itself in a defensive position and writes that it has found partners in as many as 17 European states. They are both united in their fight against Macron’s EU model which exceeds its mandate and increasingly centralizes power, which is undermining the nation-state model initiated since the 1950s. This criticism often focuses on current EU reform plans which propose expansion by majority vote with France’s decisions seen as diluting the country into a European centralized state.
Both the RN and the R! are critical of the EU’s ambition of becoming an important geopolitical actor with its own foreign and security policy. The assertion of this ambition by Commission President von der Leyen since 2019, reinforced against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, is perceived as a blatant attack on national sovereignty. According to the RN’s election program, the Commission has already unjustly assumed competences in health policy during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been imposing its asylum policy on member states for years, and is now attempting to seize security policy competences in light of the war in Ukraine. This is in stark contrast with Macron who emphasized the benefit of organized action in the EU. The parties see this as a zero-sum game: as the EU commission power grows, those of national governments diminish. This is summed up by RN lead-candidate Bardella, “France does not have to die so that Europe can live.” Both parties also criticize the invocation of ‘European Values’ which are often in conflict with those of European states while also often emphasizing their own values as European. Criticism also often involves the excess of Leftist policies and the basis of intervention in the first place. They claim that Brussels either doesn’t provide answers or fails to do so and is accused of gradual power expansion. Meanwhile, Germany is often depicted as the puppeteer and beneficiary of this development. This criticism has been constant for years but has evolved recently. The idea that the government submits to German interests in economic and financial policy and more recently in energy policy was seen in Le Pen’s 2016 remark that it was not surprising that Germany defended its own interest but she found it surprising that France did not do so as well. Likewise, R! leader Zemmour spoke about French-German relations as a fantasy and urged that France needs to immediately return to a sober assessment of both French interests and of its neighbor.
The beginning of the Ukraine War has evolved the criticism towards Germany. Not only does the French right claim that France is failing to defend its interest and policy but there is an increasing scrutiny of EU interests as represented in Germany. Le Pen accused Macron of betraying France due to his proposal that France’s nuclear weapons could become part of a common European deterrence, weakening France’s own sovereign rule and security in favor for the EU.
This article summarized the evolving criticism facing not only Germany but the broader EU which has intensified since the Ukraine war underscored broader geopolitical concerns within Europe. The rise of nationalistic right-wing parties has led to increasing demands for national sovereignty and security. Not only are there accusations of Germany’s dual ambitions in economic and military realms, but also against the EU as collecting both power and presence in the international sphere to the detriment of individual states. This could lead to a reevaluation and scrutinization of the future trajectory in EU policies, particularly in areas such as defense, energy, and foreign relations. Geopolitically, this could lead to shifts in alliances and strategies among EU member states, impacting not only internal cohesion but also Europe’s position in global affairs. Moreover, the Franco-German discord could amplify existing fault lines within the EU, affecting consensus-building on critical issues like defense integration, energy security, and foreign policy alignment in favor of sovereign national interest which is expressed through the rise of right-wing political parties in Europe. As debates intensify over the future direction of European integration, including the potential for deeper political and military cooperation, Europe’s geopolitical landscape may witness shifts in power dynamics and strategic alignments.
By: Kareem Ağa Doğan, CIGA Non-resident Researcher