The Algeria-Morocco Rupture: A Major Test for Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation

Summary:

In August of 2021, less than a year after the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and Morocco, Algeria announced that it was cutting relations with Morocco. While the Abraham Accords ensured the United States’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, it also deepened the conflict between the two neighboring Maghreb countries. To understand how this conflict affects the relations of the two countries with their European neighbors and therefore Euro-Mediterranean cooperation as a whole, it is necessary to illustrate the existing cooperation frameworks in the Mediterranean.

Reinvigorated by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 1995 Barcelona Process (also called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), aimed to promote structural reforms while ensuring the stability of Europe’s security by expanding the European Union’s sphere of stability and development to Mediterranean countries through large-scale free trade agreements and substantial financial assistance.

However, the framework did not prove successful. Following setbacks suffered by certain initiatives promoted within it, other competing cooperation frameworks have emerged, notably, the 2004 European Neighborhood Policy. In addition to certain countries in the Arab world, this  cooperation framework also includes states distant from the region, both geographically and socio-culturally. This “catch-all” framework has received numerous criticisms because of the overly general nature of its approach that ignores the socio-economic and cultural differences of the targeted countries. Promoting a uniform action plan, the European Neighborhood Policy is based on the unilateral promotion of the values of the Old Continent, defined as those of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. This dialogue of the deaf led certain foreign powers, such as China, to fill this void by financing large-scale projects in the Maghreb region, without imposing conditions in terms of reform and respect for human rights. At the same time, the failure of the Arab Spring and the rise of authoritarian regimes led the EU to favor the preservation of stability and its national interests to the detriment of the fundamental principles of the Barcelona Process.

Moreover, in 2008, then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy launched the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which was presented as the continuation of the Barcelona Process. This initiative had the initial objective of developing major cooperation projects, such as cleaning up pollution in the Mediterranean Sea and a solar energy plan. However, the beginnings of UfM were strewn with pitfalls, starting with the failure of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and Palestine, both member states. Today, however, the organization is fundamentally different to the European Neighborhood Policy: it aims to be co-managed by the “South” as much as the “North”. Nevertheless, despite an institutional identity based on an equal footing between all its member states, it is clear that the organization struggles to carry out co-construction projects. The majority of initiatives promoted by the institution are therefore implemented either within the EU or between the non-European member-state countries, but rarely between both regions at the same time.

Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining any political alignment between the 43 countries of the Mediterranean with their wildly different strategic priorities is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges for promoting joint projects. One of the most prominent instances of this difficulty came in the rupture between Algeria and Morocco, which weakened the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a whole, and significantly impacted the relations of European countries, notably France and Spain, with the two Maghreb countries.

At the beginning of 2021, the leader of the Polisario Front and president of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Brahim Ghali, was hospitalized in Spain “for strictly humanitarian reasons”, according to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Ghali’s hospitalization in Spain at Algeria’s request sparked a crisis between Rabat and Madrid. Morocco reacted by withdrawing its ambassador to Madrid, which was followed by the sudden entry of thousands of migrants into Ceuta, a Spanish coastal enclave surrounded (and claimed) by Morocco, in May 2021. Spain claimed that this influx was facilitated by a brief lifting of border surveillance by Morocco.

Tensions between the two capitals only eased in March 2022 when Spanish President Pedro Sanchez sent a letter to King Mohammed VI in which he recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This decision, however, proved disastrous for Spain’s relationship with Algeria. The latter, being a fervent supporter for the independence of Western Sahara, considered this a betrayal and responded by withdrawing its ambassador, then unilaterally suspending the friendship treaty in force between the two countries since 2002.

The rivalry between Morocco and Algeria extended to the economic, political, and military spheres, further fueling tensions in this tripartite dynamic. Economic ties have weakened, impacting regional prosperity. Spain in particular paid a high price: Spanish exporters lost nearly a billion dollars during the seven months following the cessation of commercial relations initiated by Algeria, leading to the fall of Spain’s position as Algeria’s second-largest exporter in 2021 to ninth place in 2022. Taking advantage of the situation, Italy seized the opportunity to position itself as a privileged partner of Algeria, signing 15 agreements with it covering a wide range of sectors.

For their part, relations between France, Morocco, and Algeria are complex and evolving. France, traditionally an ally of Morocco, has tried to maintain a balancing act in this conflict, which has earned it criticism from both parties. In Algeria, perception of France is often marked by the colonial past, with the breakdown in relations between Algiers and Rabat only reigniting these tensions. On the economic front, the suspension of direct flights on several occasions since 2020 between the two countries has disrupted trade, and French investments in Algeria have slowed down.

In terms of relations with Morocco, France has not followed the American position of recognizing Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara despite Morocco’s expectations. Tensions intensified in September 2021 when Paris reduced visas for Moroccans, while Macron attempted a rapprochement with Algeria. At the same time, the revelations about espionage via Pegasus software and the European Parliament’s criticism of press freedom in Morocco have also undermined trust between Paris and Rabat. Tensions further increased after Morocco refused French aid during the September 2023 earthquake, while accepting Spanish aid, showing that Rabat no longer considers Paris a close ally. The question of Western Sahara is now the cornerstone of Moroccan diplomacy, with the country clearly demonstrating that it will accept nothing less than unconditional support from its historic allies on the issue.

As for the EU, even though it is positioning itself in the background on the question of Western Sahara, the persistence of this conflict has had consequences for its commercial relations with the Maghreb countries. In 2019, the European Union, under the framework of its neighborhood policy, negotiated an agreement with Morocco to renew access for European vessels to Moroccan waters in exchange for financial aid. Upon the objections of the Polisario Front and the raising of the question of Western Sahara’s contested status, the European Parliament requested a legal opinion from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The latter invalidated the agreement, ruling that it was not applicable to Western Sahara without the consent of the Sahrawi people. This demonstrates that the Euro-Mediterranean relationship is essentially relegated to two cooperation frameworks: the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean.

In terms of the Union for the Mediterranean, the question of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute is conspicuous by its absence. For a structure initially designed for the promotion of concrete cooperation projects aiming to improve regional integration, it was surely naive to believe that these projects could override the region’s political dynamics and frictions which often supersede all other considerations.

In conclusion, the diplomatic crisis between Algeria and Morocco has revealed the fragilities of multi-lateral relations in the Maghreb region and its repercussions on strategic partnerships with Europe. It has hampered economic cooperation, complicated the management of migratory flows, and weakened historic ties between European nations and those of the Maghreb.

This crisis highlights the persistent challenges facing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, particularly within the Union, for the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the position of the European Union on the Western Sahara issue highlights the limits of its commitment in the region. Ultimately, the Algerian-Moroccan crisis highlights the need for a more proactive and concerted approach on the part of Europe to promote stability and development in the Euro-Mediterranean region if it wishes to assert its ambition as a key geopolitical player in the region. The renewal of European institutions following the June 2024 elections could provide an opportunity to reorient EU policy towards its southern neighbor. The new European Commission should seize the opportunity to develop an ambitious and realistic strategy. In a multipolar world, the era of “top-down” approaches to cooperation and development programs that have prevailed until now seems to be over. The future will either be shaped jointly, or it will not happen at all.

By: Asma Bahi, CIGA Research Intern