Author: Emile Hokayem
Affiliation: the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Organization/Publisher: Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
Date/Place: Dec 5, 2022/ US
Type of Literature: Journal Article
Number of Pages: 16
Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150422
Keywords: Saudi Arabia-US relations, Russia-Saudi Relations, Mohammed bin Salman, Foreign Policy
Brief:
This article aims to discuss Saudi Arabia’s changing foreign policy under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and its implications on various aspects of the country’s relationships with other nations, particularly the US and Russia. The author begins with the announcement by the OPEC+ group, led by Russia and Saudi Arabia, of an oil-production cut of 2 million barrels per day on October 5th. This move aimed to increase Russian oil revenue and economically impact Western rivals, especially before Europe’s challenging winter and the challenging US midterm elections. This, according to the author, illustrates Russia’s use of energy as a weapon. Furthermore, the Saudi decision was followed a visit by US President Biden, which some interpreted as Riyadh leveraging oil to empower Russia and support Republicans in the midterms. The White House warned that might have to re-evaluate its relationship with the country due to concerns over Russian aggression. However, Saudi officials justified the production cut by predicting reduced demand and lower prices due to Western recessions and China’s COVID-related stagnation, which would lessen demand and lower prices. After Saudi Arabia was able to recover from economic challenges, it sought to protect its improving economy, which in the past had been mainly driven by higher oil prices. In the US, however, a proposed bill called NOPEC (No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels, aimed at reducing OPEC’s power) gained bipartisan support, reflecting mistrust between the US and Saudi Arabia, and the deteriorating state of their relationship, driven by strategic differences over Iran, regional security, and global competition. While US businesses see opportunities in Saudi Arabia, energy is no longer the primary bond. Saudi exports are increasingly directed towards the East. In 2021, 50% of their exports went to China, Japan, India, and South Korea, while only 5% went to the US, reflecting the shift of focus eastward for prosperity while maintaining a security link to the West.
Moreover, tensions between the two nations are taking a personal turn. In 2019, Biden criticized Saudi Arabia’s government, and in 2022, MbS expressed clear indifference to how he thinks of him, which marks a departure from the cordial tone of the past. However, the author argues that bilateral relations had began their deterioration during the Obama administration due to mismatched assumptions and alignment on strategic and energy matters. Thus, the worsening state of relations reflects decreased expectations and escalating personal animosity, in addition to geo-strategic differences due to the geopolitical and geo-economic shifts in both countries.
MbS’s strategic shifts can be seen through his developing ties with Putin, which he considers more reliable than Biden. Furthermore, shared interest in oil policy and market stability through OPEC+ collaboration has solidified the relationship since 2016. In addition, Saudi Arabia has been frustrated with the US’s reluctance to provide defensive systems. It thus looked to purchase advanced Russian S-400 air defense systems. MbS also cultivated relations with individuals close to Putin. Like other Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia hesitated to openly condemn Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Saudi businesses even invested $500 million in major Russian energy companies despite Western sanctions. The author argues that this does not signify Saudi support for Russia, but rather Riyadh’s regional perspective on the conflict, mirroring the West’s stance on Iran.
However, Riyadh also made sure to distance itself from Russia’s actions. Saudi Arabia voted against Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian land at the UN after the OPEC+ decision and provided $400 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine. MbS used his influence with Putin to secure the release of Western prisoners from Russian custody. Additionally, Riyadh is concerned about Moscow’s growing defense ties with Iran, which were recently demonstrated by Iran’s supply of unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia in its Ukraine conflict. However, the author claims that after enduring economic challenges and Western isolation, Saudi Arabia has impressively recovered. The turmoil in energy markets due to the Ukraine conflict underscored the Kingdom’s significance in energy politics and improved its economic prospects. MbS is actively reshaping Saudi Arabia’s image, positioning it as a contemporary global force. This involves challenging established foreign policy norms and moving beyond its historical role as a proponent of the Islamic and Arab world. This re-evaluation has brought significant change to Saudi diplomacy, causing both concern and enthusiasm both inside and outside the country. MbS aims to lessen the burdens of Saudi Arabia’s conventional claims to Islamic and Arab leadership, which he views as restrictive and costly. Islamic and Arab solidarity will no longer automatically restrict Saudi policies. MbS’s approach reflects a new generation of Saudi leaders who are less attached to the issues that consumed their predecessors. This emerging elite finds the past emphasis on regional relationships inefficient and uncoordinated, leading to dependencies, foreign expectations, and damaging controversies. It also made Saudi citizens more focused on regional conflicts than on embracing national identity and modernization, in their view. In Riyadh, there is a strong feeling that past relationships, from Pakistan to Lebanon, have not yielded the expected outcomes. Saudi Arabia’s assistance did not secure support from Egypt or Pakistan during its Yemen campaign in 2015. Lebanon, a previous focus, now disappoints as Hezbollah threatens both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 1996 backfired, with al-Qaeda plotting against the royal family from Afghanistan. Support for Syrian rebels led to accusations of indirectly aiding ISIS. Even the decision to intervene in Yemen reflects flawed Saudi policies, as Yemeni leaders cultivated by Riyadh were unreliable and deceitful.
These evaluations have had significant effects, notably in the Levant, where Saudi Arabia played a major role. The Kingdom’s connections to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were both personal and strategic, with Saudi royals forming friendships with national leaders. However, MbS adopted a pragmatic stance towards these relationships, viewing them as un-beneficial. In Lebanon, the Saudi-backed Hariri dynasty could not control Hezbollah, leading to disengagement in 2016. The Trump administration’s rejection of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process undermined Jordan, which depended on Saudi support and now felt threatened by Saudi ambitions. Riyadh even considered replacing Jordan’s role in managing Jerusalem’s Muslim sites. Jordan complained of decreased Saudi aid, causing economic damage. In Syria, Saudi Arabia’s inability to remove the Assad regime and the dominance of Turkey and Iran frustrated the Kingdom. Thus, MbS chose to minimize losses and withdraw from the Syrian crisis.
In a change of approach, Riyadh indicated it would no longer automatically support Muslim causes. When India altered Kashmir’s constitutional status in 2019, Saudi Arabia’s response was relatively subdued, causing dissatisfaction in Pakistan. Significantly, Riyadh prioritized cultivating economic and defense relations with rising New Delhi over aligning with Islamabad, despite their historical security partnership. Another noteworthy shift was Saudi Arabia’s backing of China regarding its oppression of the Uighurs. Amid Western criticism of China, Riyadh supported Beijing’s counter-terrorism and religious reform narrative, even signing UN letters to that effect in 2019. Formerly opposed to communism, Saudi Arabia now views building ties with China as vital for prosperity and security, aiming to avoid choosing between Washington and Beijing. In April 2022, MbS assured Chinese President Xi Jinping of unwavering support for China’s interests, including in Xinjiang, opposing external interference, and upholding countries’ rights to independent political and human rights paths.
Additionally, the Kingdom is shifting its focus to the secure and economically promising Red Sea Region. MbS’s most ambitious project is the $500 billion NEOM city on the northwest coast, backed by regaining islands from Egypt, Tiran and Sanafir, and forming a Red Sea Council. Despite disputes between Ethiopia and Egypt, Saudi Arabia has maintained positive relations with Ethiopia. Domestically, MbS prioritizes controlling religious organizations and promoting a more tolerant Islam for modernization and international image improvement. This includes reducing overseas proselytizing and engaging with non-Islamic faiths. MbS aims to establish Saudi Arabia as a modern global player, fostering ties with leading economies, evident in G20 participation. Success in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 relies on economic reform and stronger relations with major powers. The Kingdom seeks to become a comprehensive economic force, integrated into global supply chains, manufacturing, energy production, investment, sectoral growth, and a preferred partner for major corporations. With an unparalleled concentration of power, MbS is aligning Saudi Arabia’s foreign, defense, and economic policies more tightly. One example is the creation of a Chinese UAV production line, which aims to enhance defense collaboration with Beijing and facilitate local defense industry growth, technology transfers, and future weapon systems exports. Additionally, MbS has revitalized the formerly dormant Public Investment Fund (PIF), turning it into a catalyst for domestic economic progress and a tool for global investment and influence.
Furthermore, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, who aligned with MbS, became foreign minister in 2019. While primary control of the US-Saudi relationship remains with MbS and his brother Prince Khaled, Prince Faisal has been assigned to diversify Saudi relations, with ambassadors promoting more aggressive economic outreach in major capitals. Additionally, MbS has restructured Saudi energy policy, taking control over a sector previously managed by bureaucrats. MbS became chair of the Supreme Council of Saudi Aramco in 2015, displaying his willingness to use oil production as a means of influence, as seen in the October OPEC+ decision. Unlike the previous goal of stabilizing energy markets, MbS prioritizes short-term economic and strategic interests. Despite causing concern in the US, MbS has also proactively safeguarded Saudi interests against Russia. However, the 2018 Khashoggi assassination intensified perceptions of Saudi aggression, fueled by the Yemen war. This negatively affected MbS’s modernization efforts. While some in the US, including Trump, overlooked the incident, others pushed for his isolation. MbS aimed to strengthen his control by suppressing dissent, reinforcing that he was the sole option. In 2022, he became prime minister, with Egypt, UAE, and other Arab nations supporting Riyadh against US policy. Expecting marginalization attempts from Western leaders, MbS escalated strategic diversification. He cultivated ties with autocratic and populist figures in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere.
Among the relationships MbS aimed to reshape, his bond with the US was crucial. Initially seen as a modernizer, he admired the US and embarked on a three-week tour there in 2018. However, MbS perceived the US under Obama as an unreliable partner due to its Yemen involvement, diplomacy with Iran, Asia pivot, and indecision on the issue of Syria. Trump’s victory fueled hope for a more cooperative America, leading to a promising visit to Riyadh in 2017 and apparent alignment. However, these prospects faded as Trump’s personal views did not always translate into policy. By 2020, Saudi Arabia struggled: oil prices were low, US ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran yielded less, the Qatar boycott failed, and Yemen’s Houthi insurgency persisted. Biden’s election suggested tense relations due to his stance on Iran, critical comments toward Saudi Arabia, and emphasis on human rights and relations with Russia and China. Moreover, the Kingdom’s distancing from the US had tangible consequences. Escalating Houthi attacks and Iranian strikes highlighted Saudi vulnerabilities, endangering civilians, and causing embarrassment. The US response mainly provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and defense systems, but these were limited, and the withdrawal of US assets from the region raised concerns about American reliability.
Consequently, MbS shifted his approach to focus on economic modernization and regional de-escalation. Notably, he reconciled with Qatar, improving relations and normalization. Relations with Oman also improved under Sultan Haitham’s leadership. MbS hosted Turkish President Erdoğan, despite past rivalry and his regional ambitions and support for Islamists that concerned MbS. Erdoğan’s initial involvement in the Khashoggi case caused friction, but he eventually backed moving the trial to Saudi Arabia, easing tensions. Riyadh engaged in dialogue with Tehran in Baghdad, aiming to de-escalate Yemen’s conflict and demonstrate its flexibility to the US. Saudi Arabia adjusted its Yemen objectives, collaborating with the US and UN for a ceasefire and pressuring President Hadi to resign in 2022. The Houthis, not Saudi Arabia, opposed the ceasefire renewal in October. These actions alleviated pressure on Saudi Arabia but did not change the US stance. Biden maintained a firm position, avoiding direct communication with MbS and entrusting relationship management to advisers. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shifted the dynamics. Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to support Western diplomacy and the OPEC+ agreement breach angered the West, causing tensions. This showed Saudi Arabia’s significance to its traditional partners. After diplomatic efforts, Biden recognized the need for a detente with the Kingdom. His visit aimed to assure Middle East partners of US military support for regional security. The October crisis revealed Riyadh’s willingness to prioritize economic interests and energy market influence with Russia, potentially unsettling Washington. In the short term, the author claims that Saudi-US security cooperation is likely to persist despite this disagreement.
MbS has managed to establish a more independent foreign policy for Saudi Arabia, less bound by traditional partners and domestic constraints. However, his recalibration has not been entirely successful due to significant policy limitations. While the Crown Prince attempted to have closer ties with Israel at Trump’s encouragement, this was curbed by King Salman’s commitment to the Palestinian cause. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel comes at a higher cost compared to UAE and Bahrain. A similar approach is seen with Syria, where Riyadh seeks more concessions, including a reduction in Iranian-Syrian relations. Failing that, Saudi Arabia aims to align interests with Russia, which it sees as best suited to counter Iranian influence. The close relationship between MbS and UAE’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has not developed into the anticipated alliance either. While sharing geopolitical goals, economic competition and concerns over Saudi ambitions have hindered a full partnership. It remains uncertain to what degree Saudi Arabia’s new direction can counter Iran’s challenge, as many of the countries being approached lack the capacity or willingness to provide security or take sides. During a vulnerable period after Iranian and Houthi attacks on oil infrastructure, only the US and France sent defensive systems, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s dependence on traditional Western allies.
At its core, Saudi Arabia’s global stature rests on its leadership claim over the Arab and Islamic world. Its former close relationship with the US also held significant power. Despite reorienting its foreign policy, as shown by the October crisis, Riyadh remains confident it can retain its security ties with the US. It is relying on its increasing geo-economic influence to navigate and profit from what it perceives as a new global order. Thus, the author concludes that Saudi Arabia is seeking to establish a more independent foreign policy that is less dependent on traditional partners and domestic constraints, and MbS is shifting focus to economic modernization, strategic diversification, and engagement with rising global powers. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the US and Russia is evolving, as the nation prioritizes short-term economic interests over historical and traditional alliances.
By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern
