Authors: 14 Task Force Members on US-China Policy Organization/Publisher: 21st Century China Center, University of California San Diego Date/Place: October 12, 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Policy Brief Word Count: 4500 Link: https://china.ucsd.edu/policy/task-force/policy-brief-taiwan.html Keywords: China, Taiwan, US, Taiwan Strait, One-China Policy, Geopolitics, War, Deterrence, South China Sea, Communist Party of China Brief: There is no longer any ambiguity in the US policy towards China, as Washington has identified Beijing as its only competitor in the coming times and believes that it “needs to be reined in” to prevent harm to the world’s most powerful economy and military. One of the main measures that Washington has taken in this regard is targeting Taiwan, an island nation with a population of around 24 million. However, this policy paper strongly advises against escalation and warns that “despite rising tensions, it is both essential and possible to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait. None of the three governments wants war. But to avoid war, all three governments must avoid steps that force the other side to launch a military conflict.” Tensions between Taiwan and mainland China were exacerbated when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made an unannounced visit to Taiwan in August, despite strong objections from Beijing, which does not want Taiwan to be recognized as a separate entity. The US formally recognized China in 1979 and moved its diplomatic mission from Taipei to Beijing, adopting the “One-China Policy” under which Taiwan is considered part of mainland China. This policy was also adopted by the United Nations. However, Taipei has maintained its independence since 1949. The Taiwan Relations Act, which was enacted in 1979, has governed US relations with Taiwan. The Three Communiques, a series of bilateral agreements, have also influenced these ties. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, marked the first time in 25 years that a sitting speaker of the US Congress traveled to the island nation, located south of mainland China across the Taiwan Strait. This visit was seen as the biggest provocation in recent times, and in response, Beijing conducted massive military exercises in the air and at sea around Taiwan and fired missiles, some of which flew over the island. The rule of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, a nationalist and center-left political party, is also seen by Beijing as promoting independence, and as a result, has faced criticism and actions by the Chinese authorities, including the sanctioning of some of its officials. As China’s economic and military influence has expanded, more nations have recently switched their diplomatic relations to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with full-fledged diplomatic relations with only 14 nations. However, Taiwan has never been ruled by Beijing, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed in 1949. The military exercises launched in response to Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan were also seen as China showcasing its military might – it has the world’s largest naval fleet – and the armory it deployed almost blocked off Taiwan’s maritime borders. The US has increased its military activities near Chinese waters, which has led Taiwan to increase its defense relations with the US and place weaponry orders worth $8 billion since the Trump administration. The Biden administration has continued this policy and even ramped up the rhetoric, stating that the US will militarily intervene to help Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Biden’s reiteration of military support to Taiwan has only reinforced the belief that the US has moved from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity with regard to China. This belief is also supported by the fact that the US national security establishment has targeted Chinese firms, including chip manufacturers, and Chinese citizens, linking them to the Chinese military and intelligence agencies. However, the 14 authors of this policy paper remind Washington of theorist Thomas Schelling’s belief that “effective deterrence of the PRC requires not only the credible threat of a forceful response to an attack on Taiwan, but also the credible assurance that if the PRC refrains from attacking Taiwan, interests considered vital to Beijing will not be damaged anyway.” When considering Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy, which many experts describe as the third phase of China’s development since independence, he has insisted on the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China. Xi Jinping’s recent re-election as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief for a record third time is also viewed in a similar light, as China would not want to see destabilization in its economic and military progress despite widespread criticism for its handling of Xinjiang, also known as East Turkistan. Western nations, including the US, which have suffered the devastating impact of COVID-19 with tens of thousands of deaths, have heavily criticized China’s strict pandemic policy, which has apparently led to a low number of deaths (only 5,226 according to Chinese official figures). This policy paper strongly argues against turning the current situation into a full-fledged war, stating that the goal for both sides must be “to keep rising tensions from evolving into a shooting war that would be extremely dangerous and destructive for all sides and that could result in the use of nuclear weapons.” The policy paper also notes that the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland remains at the core of China’s policy, regardless of who leads the government and the CCP. While Beijing has consistently stated that it prefers peaceful reunification, it has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this goal. Beijing has also expressed its desire to control Taiwan under the “One country, Two systems” mechanism. Xi’s recent interactions with military commanders, focusing on combat and war preparedness, show that Beijing’s consistent policy is to fully modernize the People’s Liberation Army by 2027. The policy paper also highlights the different governance models pursued by Beijing and Taipei. While the CCP is the single party that has ruled China since its independence, Taiwan underwent a transition to democracy in 1986 and has a vibrant presidential, legislative, and local elections system. The paper notes that “this is at odds with the Chinese identity that an earlier generation of leaders on Taiwan endorsed, and which Beijing has sought to perpetuate,” citing a June 2022 survey that found 63.7% of respondents in Taiwan identifying as Taiwanese rather than both Chinese and Taiwanese (30.4%). At the same time, the paper states that Beijing has “emerged from a period of strategic caution to assert its interests more strongly by, for example, reclaiming land and building military installations atop seven reefs in the South China Sea, sending coast guard ships daily into waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands whose ownership China contests with Japan, and enrolling many of its neighbors in its Belt and Road Initiative to tie their economies more closely to China’s. The paper adds that “China appears convinced that the United States seeks to prevent China from ever achieving what it sees as its legitimate national objectives, and that US policy on Taiwan is part of that strategy. The US appears convinced that Chinese pressure on Taiwan threatens US values and interests. Taiwan, for its part, has done what it can to consolidate its distinct democratic identity at home and to cultivate de facto international status as an autonomous political entity.” The authors suggest three steps to avoid a war, including asking Taiwan not to declare independence, urging Washington not to recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and preventing Beijing from using military force against Taiwan to compel unification. However, in Washington, many believe that allowing China to control Taiwan would “render impossible the defense of US allies in Asia.” The authors note that “strategic clarity is hardly necessary because (Chinese) Mainland leaders and the PLA already fully expect and plan for US intervention if China acts militarily to take control of Taiwan.” In addition to suggesting an upgrade of its weaponry, including warships and aircraft deployed in the region, the authors argue that Taiwan “must demonstrate its ability to maintain resilience during a blockade and impose high costs on an invading PRC force” and create “deeper reserves of strategic resources like fuel and food in case the PRC elects to blockade the island.” They urge Washington to focus on peace in the Taiwan Strait and reiterate its stance against Taiwan’s independence, and also to involve allies in discussions about “their own stake in peace and stability in cross-Strait relations and the need for them to contribute to a moderate and responsible US strategy to deter mainland belligerence.” The authors also argue against making any “politically advantageous but strategically damaging statements about Taiwan” by US officials and politicians. By: Riyaz ul Khaliq, CIGA Non-resident Research Associate

Author: Emma Ashford Affiliation: Georgetown University and the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at Stimson Center Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: September-October 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Book Review Word Count: 3622 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/praise-lesser-evils-realism-foreign-policy- emma-ashford Keywords: Classical Realism, Structural Realism, Geopolitics, Hyper-rationalism, Morals, Human Factors, War in Ukraine, the US Foreign Policy Brief: In this article, Ashford critically reviews two recent books about Realism in International Relations: “The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought between Germany and the United States” by Matthew Specter, and “Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics” by Jonathan Kirshner. Both books address the limitations and potential of realism, focusing on “Classical Realism”, which is based on a negative view of human nature. Specter’s book examines the origins of classical realism in the pre-World War I period, attempting to uncover what he considers “the malevolent historical roots” of realist philosophy and its terminology. Kirshner’s book, on the other hand, aims to rehabilitate classical realism as a framework for understanding modern geopolitics, and to confront “Structural Realism” (Neorealism), which the author sees as having analytical shortcomings, hyper rationality, and a lack of moral consideration. Structural realism (both defensive and offensive) has come to dominate over other strands of realism and has become synonymous with realism in general. The two books come amid growing questions about the feasibility and relevance of realism in explaining current wars and great power competitions, particularly the Ukrainian war. A number of prominent realists, led by John Mearsheimer, have argued that this war was a result of the structural factor of NATO’s eastward expansion, rather than the aggressive actions of President Putin, which has led to a decline in realism’s popularity. Opponents of realism have also criticized the theory as “meaningless”, as the war in Ukraine seems to demonstrate. This has led to a revival of the historical debate about the ethical dimension of realism, with some arguing that a realistic analysis of the harsh realities of international relations (based on anarchy and states’ pursuit of security and survival, acting in accordance with national interest rather than moral principles) endorses selfish behavior by states rather than providing a positivist diagnosis. So the realists have been accused of having no morals at all, as the debate on the Ukraine war demonstrate. For such reason Robert Gilpin wrote -in 1996- his famous essay, “No One Loves a Political Realist.” The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author sets the context of the growing criticism of realism, which has led to a decline in its popularity after it gained acceptance among elites and the general public due to its often reasonable analysis of the ideological American foreign policy driven by liberal internationalism over the past three decades. Ashford believes that while realism provides useful broad lines of analysis regarding the war in Ukraine (such as the argument that NATO expansion into post-Soviet space contributed significantly to the outbreak of the war), it is flawed in many details. She also argues that the war in Ukraine demonstrates that some realist theories are as simplistic and unhelpful in explaining the conflict as they were during times of global geopolitical upheaval. According to Ashford, the realist theories presented in Specter and Kirshner’s books may not offer new insights, but they do review and update our understanding of the pragmatic and analytical model of classical realism, which may be the most suitable model for our multipolar world. In the second part of the article, Ashford discusses Specter’s critique of classical realism and realism in general. Specter offers an alternative narrative on the origins of realism, examining the intellectual foundations of realism and the biographies of prominent (German and American) founding figures of realism such as Hans Morgenthau, Wilhelm Grewe, and Carl Schmidt. Specter argues that the common narrative of realism, which is promoted by the realist Edward Hallett Carr, is false and that classical realism has dark imperial origins. This narrative claims that classical realism was the intellectual reaction of German-American thinkers such as Morgenthau to the bloody wars of the 20th century. These thinkers rejected the idealism of US President Woodrow Wilson, whose failure to establish a League of Nations that would resolve conflicts between nations through law and norms after World War I led to the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of World War II. In response, these thinkers returned to classic notions of Realpolitik as represented in the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli and embodied by the German leader Otto von Bismarck. Specter disputes this narrative, arguing that the classical realists invented a noble line of great thinkers, such as Thucydides and Hobbes, because their ideas fit the classical realist worldview while avoiding their more questionable historical antecedents from the 19th century imperial geopoliticians. Additionally, Specter refutes the association of realists with “Bismarckian Realpolitik” and tries to prove the connection of realism with an anti-realpolitik imperial German school, “the Weltpolitik,” which is guided by social Darwinism and grants great powers the right to geopolitical expansion and domination. These ideas were embodied in Wilhelm II’s policy in the late 19th century, as well as in Hitler’s policy during World War II. Ashford praises Specter’s genealogical work, but disagrees with some of his findings. She argues that there is nothing wrong with contemporary scholars seeking intellectual clues from history to support their case, and that Specter does not show how contemporary realists’ borrowing from historical concepts undermines the validity of their arguments. While it is true that classical realism formulated its arguments using terms familiar to 20th century imperialists, it also added terms such as “ethical seriousness” and “caution” to its legacy. If there are darker variants of realism in history, this should not invalidate more modern incarnations of the theory, such as “defensive realism”, which is a more moral approach that does not accept immoral principles or the early imperial roots of realism. In the third part of the article, Ashford discusses Kirshner’s “Unwritten Future”. Unlike Specter, Kirshner finds much value in classical realism for the analysis of today’s world and calls on contemporary scholars to revive it due to its analytical richness based on the crucial role of intellectual and internal political factors. He focuses on recent academic works that highlight the role of factors such as honor, pride, and prestige in international affairs, which are core factors for classical realists. He also criticizes structural realism, arguing that it falls into a “hyper-rationalist” view of the world that ignores the moral factor. Neorealism overestimates the rational causes of war and cannot explain anything beyond the stasis of the international system. Kirshner poses a series of problems that structural realists have struggled with recently, such as how to reconcile morality with a fundamentally amoral theory, and the malleability of the concept of the national interest. He also argues that structural realism is better at pointing out the errors of other approaches than at suggesting its own solutions, and cannot fully explain why and when wars happen or how leaders and populations will react when they do. This is why he emphasizes the importance of integrating human factors, which classical realism focuses on, in the analysis of wars. Ashford attributes Kirshner’s perception of the “hyper-rational” language of structural realists to their attempt to make their beliefs about international politics “scientific,” rather than appearing as ideological as they do to their liberal opponents. Liberalists believe that states can rise above power politics and transcend conflict through trade, international institutions, and international law, while realists disagree and see a lot of ideology and political delusions in liberalist arguments. This is why the language of realists is often seen as more rational, less ideological, and lacking in moral consideration. However, Kirshner argues that both realism and liberalism have ideological underpinnings, and that realists should stop pretending to be scientists and return to the messier terrain of classical realism, which is more analytically rich. In the last part of the article, Ashford defends the virtues of realism, emphasizing the need for it to explain international affairs or guide American foreign policy despite its limitations. In response to critics who argue that realism succeeds more in criticism than in offering alternatives, Ashford points out that there is no single political realism. There are different views within the realist paradigm and among realists on various international issues, such as how to deal with China. This has made it difficult for realists to shape policies within the current US administration or its successor. However, realists still put pressure on US administrations to justify their policy choices or adopt more pragmatic and non-ideological policies, despite their complex history with US policymakers. Although both books provide a critical overview of the problems facing realism, they fail to offer alternatives. Ashford believes Kirshner’s book is relatively better in this regard, as it assesses what it would mean in practice to rehabilitate classical realism. For example, it explores the shortcomings of classical realism and incorporates issues of political economy into its framework, as well as incorporating classical realist views into current policy debates to guide them. However, Ashford also criticizes some inconsistencies in Kirshner’s vision. While arguing that great powers have an opportunity to reassess their global commitments, he also calls on the United States to maintain the status quo, claiming that major changes are incompatible with realism’s emphasis on prudence. In contrast, Ashford believes that Specter largely punts on the question of the future of US foreign policy. He makes it clear that realism is not a reasonable path forward, at least not until it incorporates postcolonial, feminist, and critical theoretical insights, because it is too respectful of imperialist approaches, too undemocratic, and too rooted in ethically questionable philosophy. This distaste, according to Ashford, reflects the progressives’ concern about pragmatism and moderation in foreign policy when these concepts come into conflict with universal values. Realists are well aware of these problematic issues. In foreign policy, realism is often a choice between the lesser of evils. Realism does not condone “political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible,” as Morgenthau wrote. Pretending that moral principles or values can override all constraints of power and interest is not political realism; it is political fantasy. Finally, Ashford believes that with the world’s shift towards multipolarity, realism will once again become more important for the conduct of US foreign policy. By: Djallel Khechib, CIGA Senior Research Associate

Author: Ashley J. Tellis Affiliation: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Organization/Publisher: Center for Strategic & International Studies Date/Place: September 12, 2022/USA Type of Literature: Report Number of Pages: 20 Link: https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewing-american-regime-us%E2%80%93china- competition-beyond-ukraine Keywords: Capacity, Containment, Hegemony, Domestic Politics Brief: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has disrupted the international order established after World War II. This order is reliant on American power and dominance, and the international system and its benefits rely on American hegemony due to a lack of alternatives. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the rise of China pose a direct threat to the American-led international order on both domestic and international levels. To protect itself and its allies, the US is maintaining its hegemony over the European and Asian rimland. The challenges to US hegemony require it to take a proactive stance in order to shape trends in its favor. The main goal is to maintain the US’ position as the most powerful country in the world by maintaining peak military capabilities, technological innovation, economic superiority, and serving as a model for other countries to emulate. No other country has achieved the level of power the US has, allowing it to maintain its hegemony. To retain this position, the US must pursue three tasks: preserving liberal democracy both at home and abroad by spreading its ideals and using minimal force to support its institutions; protecting the global economic system and free trade relations; and physically protecting its allies through military force and Hegemonic stability is not self-sustaining and requires strong leadership and moderation in decision making based on a comprehensive perspective, which the US has been lacking in the post-Cold War era. The complex challenges posed by China, particularly in the areas of ideology, technology, and economy, can only be effectively addressed through a maximalist approach that puts adversaries on the defensive and creates an unfavorable balance of power. However, for this approach to be successful, the domestic scene must be maintained in good shape, as negative developments within the US can undermine its ability to project power abroad. It is crucial to address increasing polarization, declining domestic mobility, and to reaffirm the American ideal of pursuing the common good. The weakening of social groups that support hegemony makes it more difficult to face the challenges posed by China, especially when these challenges require a unified domestic base. Communicating the importance of these issues to the American public and building support for a maximalist approach requires meaningful communication between the leadership and the public. However, the presence of President Trump in power demonstrated how a president can use rising public disinterest in hegemonic power to limit US foreign policy and damage the country’s global standing. In addition, material support from the public, particularly constituencies that support an active foreign policy, is crucial for hegemonic foreign policy. Globalization has contributed to rising inequality and a lack of adequate social safety nets in the US, leading to reduced social mobility compared to other liberal order countries. Revitalizing the American regime at home also depends on rejuvenating its political life around the ideal of the common good, rather than focusing on the private benefit of certain constituencies. In its current situation, the US needs to utilize all of its resources to protect its own interests and those of its allies. This involves engaging with the concerns of states within its sphere of influence, particularly in Europe, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Middle East. To address the challenges posed by China, the US should focus on two projects: encouraging greater European participation in their own defense and building an effective coalition in East Asia to balance China. Europe is too far away to effectively address the China challenge on its own, so they should prioritize improving their military and economic security to give the US more room to focus on countering China. The US should also transform its East Asian alliances into a more effective security network. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a useful diplomatic tool, but it lacks the agreements to become a strong military alliance. Japan and Australia also have significant shortfalls in their military power to fully contribute to the Quad. In terms of the US position in East Asia, there needs to be a reassessment of the current strategic ambiguity. The US should augment its support for Taiwan while maintaining the One China policy by reinforcing Taiwanese de facto independence before it is too late, and clearly stating that any attempt to annex the island by force will be met with American retaliation. To strengthen American leadership, it is necessary to adopt an economic engagement strategy that is suitable for the growing power competition. China has benefited greatly from the open market, which led the Trump administration to withdraw from global economic leadership. The Biden administration has worked to reverse the anti- internationalist tendencies of Trump, but there are still concerns about China’s exploitation of global trade. Additionally, neither political party in the US is interested in expanding international trade, which has deprived the World Trade Organization (WTO) of much- needed reforms and has geopolitical implications for forming alliances. Another factor that hinders the US’ ability to recalibrate its trade policies is the domestic scene, as new agreements can lead to domestic discontent. avoiding unnecessary wars. Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was one of the most significant partial free trade agreements at the time. Domestic politics have also prevented the Biden administration from seriously considering returning to the TPP. Agreements like the TPP would have allowed for deeper economic integration among US allies, with higher standards that could have limited China’s advantages in global trade by creating economic networks that are closed off to China. On the military aspect of containment, the US has the capability to project power in the Indo-Pacific region and significantly hinder Chinese influence, but there are not enough resources being directed towards increasing US presence in this way. The administration is hesitant to make radical changes to the budget allocation between different branches of the military and cannot simply increase the budget due to domestic constraints on military spending. The future consequences of this inability to increase military presence in the Indo-Pacific region are dangerous, as the threat of Chinese or Russian influence goes beyond regional undermining of the status quo in Europe or East Asia. The real danger is the potential inability of the American political system to understand that the current challenges are threatening the liberal international order as a whole, and that the defenses put up against this threat may be inadequate. By: Omar Fili, CIGA Research Assistant

Author: Joseph S. Nye Jr. Affiliation: the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Organization/Publisher: Journal of International Affairs Date/place: September 6, 2022/New York, USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 17 Link: https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1635/6686624?searchresult=1 Keywords: US-China Relations, Power Competition, US-China Interdependence, China’s Rise Brief: In this journal article, Joseph S. Nye Jr. poses the question of whether China will displace the United States as a major power. Throughout the article, he attempts to answer the question of how the US should behave towards China and how it should react to China’s rise, in a way that will shape China’s behavior and environment without resorting to war. Many people believe that China is declining due to factors such as its failure to avoid the middle- income trap, its declining demographics, and low factory productivity. However, the future is uncertain and will depend in part on the strategy that the United States pursues, according to the author. According to Nye, realism has traditionally been the dominant model of international relations. He discusses various forms of realism, such as Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism and John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, as well as alternative versions that focus on the balance of power between a hegemonic power and a rising competitor. The author also mentions various historical metaphors that have been used to describe the current state of relations between the United States and China, but admits that these metaphors can be oversimplified or misused. He specifically mentions the Thucydides trap, the New Cold War, and the 1914 Sleepwalker as three relevant metaphors. The Thucydides trap refers to the fear that a rising power (in this case, China) can instill in a dominant power (the United States). This concept has often been applied to past events, such as the relationship between Britain and Germany before World War I. However, the author argues that the gap in power between the United States and China is larger than that between Britain and Germany, and that the relationship between these two countries was more complex than simply a response to a rising power. The author also notes that other factors, such as Russia’s rise and the growth of Slavic nationalism, influenced Germany’s decision to go to war. In addition, the author discusses the role of American foreign policy in influencing the level of fear between the two countries and the potential for misjudgments that could lead to the Thucydides trap. The author also addresses the issue of hegemonic transition and asks whether China will be able to provide global public goods, such as climate finance, stability, and freedom of the seas. The author points out that China is currently the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces and heads four important UN agencies, and is also building its Belt and Road Initiative and collaborating on efforts to address climate change. Nye discusses the metaphor of the “New Cold War,” which is often used to describe the relationship between the US and China. However, Nye disagrees with the use of this metaphor and points out differences between the US and China, as opposed to the US and the Soviet Union, which make it an inappropriate comparison. Nye also notes that attempts to economically detach the US from China would come with significant economic risks and costs. In contrast to the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which was primarily driven by military and ideological threats, Nye believes that the US must consider its allies and the combined wealth of western democracies in order to address the challenges of dealing with China in the current globalized, interdependent world. Nye argues that “the politics of global interdependence involves power with others as well as over others.” Nye’s third and final metaphor is that of the “1914 sleepwalker,” which he believes is the most applicable to the current situation. This metaphor refers to the period leading up to World War I, when all major powers were anticipating a Balkan war that would shape the balance of power. Nye emphasizes several key features of this time period, including the rise of nationalism, which posed a threat to both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the rise of pride and arrogance that led to a lack of moderation. Additionally, Nye notes the role of German policy, which was both eager and determined, yet unclear. In light of these historical lessons, Nye argues that it is important to stay alert to the rise of nationalism in China and populist nationalism in the US. He also points out the outdated nature of the US’s “double deterrence” policy, which aims to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and China from using force, and warns against reacting to tensions by blocking assets or cutting off trade with China. Instead, he advises finding ways to prevent a cold or hot war between the US and China. Following the 1992 elections, some politicians in Washington came to believe that the Cold War was over and focused instead on the perceived threat from Japan. Joseph Nye believed at the time that this issue was exaggerated and that the real challenge of China’s rise was being overlooked and underestimated. Nye argues that, while the US based its policy on realism in dealing with Japan, it took a more liberal approach to trade. Therefore, a strategy of containment would not have been effective and would have jeopardized the US’s relationships with its allies. Instead, Nye suggests that the US should try to shape China’s environment in order to influence its behavior. While it may be unrealistic to expect the US to change China’s entire political system into a democratic and liberal state, a more realistic goal would be to coexist on terms that are beneficial to US interests and values. Some believe that China is showing signs of change and opening up, while others believe that these efforts are simply strategic moves. Nye argues that, while terrorism is a significant issue, it is less important than great power competition in the current global landscape. He suggests that a strategy focused solely on terrorism could have two problems: it could lump together various types of states, leading to an underestimation of powers like Russia, and it could overlook threats from ecological globalization, such as climate change, which could have significant economic costs and potentially lead to war. Instead, Nye advises the US to adopt a strategy of “competitive coexistence” with China, viewing it as a “cooperative rivalry.” He suggests that, by working together and coordinating their policies, the US, Japan, and Europe can create a rules-based international order that protects their interests and shapes Chinese behavior. Nye also highlights several advantages that the US has over China, including its geography, energy resources, financial power, and technological innovation, but notes that China is investing in research and development and aims to lead the fourth industrial revolution. According to Nye, the US should maintain its alliance with Japan and not halt all immigration, as demonizing China and starting a Cold War would hinder cooperation on ecological interdependence and potentially lead to the growth of nuclear weapons. Nye also notes the challenges of political polarization and dealing with social and economic problems, as well as the rise of populist nativism, which could reduce immigration and undermine support for international institutions and alliances. Additionally, he highlights the importance of having a clear vision and values in crafting a successful and necessary strategy for the US. This approach should include both realism and discretion, but also a focus on democratic values and human rights in order to effectively wield soft power. In conclusion, Nye argues that a successful strategy for the US must begin within its own borders by maintaining democratic institutions and investing in research and development to stay current with technological advances. The US should also be open to the world, while structuring its military and strengthening its ties with allies. To succeed, the US must not succumb to fear of weakening or decline and should continue to cooperate with China on transnational interdependence. Ultimately, Nye offers guidance to US policymakers on how to approach the challenges of dealing with China in an era of globalization and interdependence. He emphasizes the importance of cooperation, especially in issues like climate change and global pandemics, and points out the need for cooperation that has been demonstrated in the past couple of years with the spread of COVID-19. However, Nye does not advocate for a focus on regime change in China, which he sees as unrealistic. Instead, he suggests that the US and its allies should aim to shape China’s environment and influence its behavior to align with their interests, recognizing that regime change could be a welcomed outcome if it occurs. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern

Author: Xiaoyu Pu Affiliation: Department of Political Science at University of Nevada Reno: Reno, NV, US Organization/Publisher: The Chinese Journal of International Politics Date/place: July 28, 2022/UK Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 19 Link: https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/15/3/227/6651149 Keywords: China-India Relations, Status Dilemma, Conflict of Interest, Asymmetrical Rivalry Brief: The purpose of Xiaoyu Pu’s study is to challenge the belief that the relationship between China and India is a zero-sum game. Instead, he argues that the status dilemma model can be used to better understand the dynamics of this relationship and other aspects of world politics. To support his argument, Pu compares the status dilemma model with the security dilemma and the status competition model. Through this comparison, he aims to provide a clearer understanding of the logic and mechanisms behind the status dilemma in world politics, and offer a different perspective on China-India relations. According to the author, the security dilemma is characterized by three main assumptions: an anarchical system, self-defense as the main motivation for states, and the tendency for military updates by one state to trigger similar updates in other states. This study, however, focuses specifically on the concept of status in world politics. The author defines status as a state’s beliefs about its ranking and value based on certain characteristics and qualities. It is important to note that the author differentiates between status and power, highlighting that status has more of a social and cultural meaning. Like the security dilemma, the status dilemma arises due to a lack of complete information or understanding about whether a state’s status is being challenged, leading to potential misunderstandings and conflicts. In his study, Xiaoyu Pu aims to show that the relationship between China and India is not a zero- sum game, meaning that the goals of these states may be compatible to some extent. To do this, he compares three different models of world politics – the security dilemma, the status competition model, and the status dilemma model – and highlights how the status dilemma model can provide insight into the root causes of international conflict. While the security dilemma focuses on security as the main factor driving conflict, the status competition model assumes that status is a scarce resource, making it a zero-sum game between states. The status dilemma model, on the other hand, suggests that international conflict arises from misunderstandings about what contributes to it, and that the competition for status may be overstated. The border conflict between China and India can be better understood in terms of conflicting interests rather than a focus on security, according to the author. Both countries have been vying for international status, with India particularly seeking to increase its power and status on the global stage. The author notes that India has expressed frustration with China’s reluctance to recognize India as a rising global power in international institutions, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United Nations Security Council. India perceives China’s obstruction of its membership in these organizations as an attempt to hinder India’s ambitions and diminish its status. According to Xiaoyu Pu, there are several reasons why India and China are competing for greater status in the South Asia region. Both countries possess hard and soft power that influences their competition, and they are also expanding their naval capabilities which could lead to naval competition. India is concerned about China’s efforts to strengthen its relationships with India’s neighbors, viewing it as a threat. Additionally, the balance of power in politics plays a role in the status competition between India and China. The author argues that the US’s accommodation of India is not only a matter of balancing power, but also of status. China sees the US’s actions as an attempt to limit China’s growth and establish an anti-China alliance in the region through its support of India and Prime Minister Modi’s strategy. According to the author, the status dilemma model tends to exaggerate the competitive nature of the status relationship and underestimate the potential compatibility of states’ status goals. The author suggests that China has no strategic desire to impede India’s rise on the global stage, and in fact, India’s rise aligns with China’s preference for a multipolar world. However, Indian elites perceive China as the only major power that does not accept India’s rise. Contrary to the belief that status is a scarce resource, the author of this article suggests that we are experiencing a proliferation of status abundance. The emergence of international clubs such as the Group of Twenty and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum illustrates that status can be seen as a club good, rather than a zero-sum game. While both China and India have cooperated in international clubs, their goals for international status within the UN system may be compatible to some extent. However, the author notes that rising powers may not always seek to increase their power, as it can be costly. Previous studies have assumed that India will always strive for greater recognition as a great power, but the author argues that India has actually protested being over-recognized due to its rise in the international system. In contrast, China is working towards great power status while trying to maintain its image as a developing country. Xiaoyu Pu identifies power asymmetry and motivated reasoning as two sources of mistrust and miscommunication between China and India. He points out that while India initiated economic liberalization in the 1990s, China began its reforms in the 1970s and has since become a much stronger economic power. China has also gained membership in various “great power clubs” and has even established new international institutions. This difference in growth between the two countries has resulted in a power asymmetry and has led China to view India as less of a threat, while causing India to be more sensitive to Chinese actions. The author argues that both countries have succumbed to misperception, with Indian officials interpreting every Chinese action as motivated by zero-sum thinking, and China perceiving India’s partnership with the US an attempt to resist and obstruct China’s rise. Another example cited by the author is India’s failure to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which India attributes to China’s efforts to hinder its rise, while the author asserts that China’s opposition to India’s membership in the NSG was driven by concerns about its criteria. The concept of motivated reasoning – the idea that people’s motivations shape their evaluation of information – may also contribute to misperception between the two countries, as states may not objectively assess threats or opportunities in the international arena. According to the author, China’s perception of India is generally more negative than India’s perception of China. However, the author repeatedly emphasizes the potential for a non-zero-sum-game relationship between the two countries. While the author suggests that China does not view India as a threat, misperception and mistrust contribute to the ongoing conflict between them. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern