Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans Amidst Soft Power and De-Europeanisation

Authors: Başak Alpan & Ahmet Erdi Öztürk Affiliation: Middle East Technical University, London Metropolitan University Organization/Publisher: Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Date/Place: February 7, 2022/UK Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 19 Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2022.2034370 Keywords: Soft Power, Foreign Policy, the Balkans Brief: Turkey’s influence in the Balkans has grown in recent years, with a focus on using religious, political, and economic strategies to achieve its goals. The country’s approach to the Balkans has been characterized by soft power, starting with its “zero problems with neighbors” policy in the early 2000s. Since the rise of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has taken on a leadership role in the region. However, in light of domestic changes and de- Europeanization in both the Balkans and Turkey, Turkey’s foreign policy has become more assertive, shifting away from its earlier reliance on soft power. This approach is manifested in three dimensions: normative soft power, which relies on religion and nationalism; material soft power, such as investments in both state and non-state entities in the Balkans; and personal soft power, which is reflected in the relationships between regional leaders and their respective networks. In the early 2000s, Turkish foreign policy was closely aligned with the European Union’s framework of democratic reforms. The accession process encouraged Turkey to adopt a peaceful, soft power approach to its foreign policy, with the goal of incorporating the EU’s soft power techniques, which rely on cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions, into its regional approach. However, starting in the 2010s, Turkish foreign policy began to diverge from this EU-friendly model. Key factors in this shift included the start of the Syrian civil war and the emergence of major security concerns such as the rise of Kurdish militias and ISIS, as well as the refugee crisis and the destabilization of the region. The nuclear deal between the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran also raised concerns that Iran could have greater influence in the region, before the deal was later scrapped by the US. Turkish foreign policy shifted further with military interventions in northern Syria in 2016 and 2018, as the country adopted a more assertive, revisionist approach to its past patterns. Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone a shift towards de-Europeanization, meaning that its institutions and policies are no longer fully aligned with EU standards or demands. Relations between Turkey and the EU have deteriorated since the 2005 period, particularly in regards to cooperation on issues such as migration and energy. However, there is still some level of “selective Europeanization,” where EU-style policy reform is accepted as long as it serves certain objectives. This shift in Turkey’s approach has been attributed to the rise of authoritarian rule, which is said to have resulted in a foreign policy based on an aggressive, religious, and nationalist foundation. It is understandable that Turkey’s relations with the West have weakened, given the reasons for its shift towards a more independent policy. The post-coup period and the lack of European and Western support for the Turkish government led to an independent and assertive foreign policy. However, branding this change as a descent into authoritarianism does not adequately capture the complexity of the new policies. It is important to consider the Western approach to the region and its destabilizing effect on Turkish national interests. It is not feasible for Turkey to follow a policy paradigm that is friendly to the West, regardless of whether it is harmful, simply because it aligns with EU/US style. It is not surprising that a trade- oriented approach has been balanced with a security-oriented one in light of regional events, and not just because the ruling party has domestic power ambitions. In addition, Turkey and the EU have had conflicts over drilling in the East Mediterranean, which are connected to issues involving Cyprus and the Aegean Islands with Greece. The EU has expressed support for Cyprus and Greece in regards to their territorial claims and threatened punitive measures against Turkey’s drilling activities. It is not realistic to expect Turkey to sit back and allow two of its neighbors to isolate it from the sea in an attempt to gain geopolitical leverage against it. It is true that domestic events can influence foreign policy. Ignoring regional events or the unhelpful stance of the EU towards Turkey can lead to misunderstandings in analysis. The shift in Turkish foreign policy cannot be attributed solely to authoritarianism fueled by chauvinistic rhetoric. Turkey’s approach to the Balkans has seen a significant increase in depth since the time of Turgut Özal, with a reliance on diplomacy and soft power methods dating back even further. The rise of Erdoğan to power marked an intensification of relations, particularly in the early 2000s as the region underwent a process of Europeanization. Institutions such as the Turkish Diyanet, TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), and Yunus Emre Institute have played a role in building influence. Despite the changes in Turkish foreign policy in the post-2010s period, this dynamic has not changed much, if at all. This is particularly evident in how Balkan actors perceive Turkey’s presence, with Muslims generally viewing it positively and others with suspicion. However, the changes in the nature of Turkish policies in the 2010s have had some impact, reflected in the differing opinions on Turkish influence. One camp sees the increasing influence as a reflection of the historical ties between Turkey and the Balkans, while the other voices concerns about what they perceive as a neo-Ottoman hegemonic project. The departure from EU ideals also plays a role in the new dynamic in the region with regard to Turkish presence, but it cannot be said that the soft power approach has disappeared or is no longer central in the Balkans. It is noteworthy that the most active field is the religious domain, with the Turkish Diyanet establishing representative offices throughout the Balkans, particularly in Albania, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia. Turkey’s approach to the region garners favor in the domestic popular scene by strengthening relations with Muslims on the international stage. Additionally, the increasing de-Europeanization in the region has caused regional actors to turn to their religious identities as a substitute for the less appealing EU ideals. Claims of rising authoritarianism try to explain this shift as a criticism of the new status quo. However, it is more likely that the current status quo and its further evolution away from EU ideals is a natural development. Perhaps EU liberal principles are no longer able to address the needs of the region and its people. In addition to its religious activities, Turkey’s foreign policy also includes a significant focus on the economic domain. In 2016, Turkey invested $200 billion in 11 regional countries, with indirect investments made through institutions like TIKA and the Yunus Emre Institute. The economic domain is supported through both state apparatus and commercial activities by businessmen close to the state. It is clear that Turkey is increasing its presence through both direct and indirect economic relations, supported by aid activities throughout the Balkans. Despite economic challenges, Turkish influence remains significant in the region. Additionally, the increased importance of strong leader figures in the Balkans has allowed for deeper relations between Balkan states beyond just popular rhetoric, providing additional avenues for conducting foreign policy in the region through personal relations between government leaders. In conclusion, Turkey’s proximity to the Balkans has allowed it to effectively use soft power to increase its role in the region. Up until the early 2010s, Turkish foreign policy was influenced by the EU, after which significant changes led to a more assertive approach in Turkey’s neighboring regions. Turkey has used the domains of economy and religion to increase its influence, relying on both the normative and material aspects of soft power. Domestic changes may influence how Turkish foreign policy shifts, in addition to the de-Europeanization of foreign policy, which may bring challenges in relations with non-Muslim states in the Balkans. By: Omar Fili, CIGA Research Assistant

Turkey’s Isolation from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum: Ideational Mechanisms and Material Interests in Energy Politics

Authors: Pınar İpek & V. Tibet Gür Affiliation: TOBB University of Economics and Technology (Ankara, Türkiye), and Rutgers University (New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA) Organization /Publisher: The Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center/Turkish Studies (Routledge) Date/Place: May 16, 2021/ the UK Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 31 Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2021.1925884?journalCode=ftur20 Keywords: Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, Regionalization, Cooperation, Energy, Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye Brief: The article discusses the patterns of inter-state enmity and amity in the regionalization process during the formation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The authors use a constructivist approach to analyze the changes in foreign policy objectives and identify the role of ideational mechanisms as a factor in constructing material interests in the lack of cooperation between Türkiye and other regional states, with particular reference to Türkiye’s isolation from the EMGF. The discoveries of offshore natural gas resources, first in Israel and later around the island of Cyprus, have escalated political disputes in the region and created new patterns of amity. In the case of hydrocarbon politics, Türkiye, Republic of Cyprus, and Greece’s policy discourses differ in cooperative and conflictual contexts. The authors assume that the ideational mechanism plays an essential role in policy changes. Contextual ‘frames’ are identified and used to analyze and measure how policy elites think about an issue; i.e., how that issue is framed in their minds and reflected in their speeches can profoundly impact their attitudes and policy choices. A dataset of 286 press releases and statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, Greece, and RoC, as well as related archived speeches of the respective presidencies between 2010-2020 were framed in five different contexts: cooperative economic, conflictual economic, cooperative security, conflictual security, and socio-cultural. The authors use Amitav Acharya’s theoretical framework to explain ideational mechanisms that constructed material interests in the regionalization process during the formation of the EMGF. The authors’ three ways that ideas and material interests shape the politics of regional orders are 1) cognitive priors, 2) redefined causal ideas, and 3) exogenous ideas. Cognitive priors are preexisting ideas of individuals and societies about the world and other actors. Thus, cognitive priors reflect how actors interpret inter-subjective structures beyond rational cost and benefit calculations. The authors’ findings demonstrate that the dominant ‘conflictual security’ framing in the RoC and Greece’s discourse persistently translated into policy guidance from 2010 through 2020. Türkiye’s official policy has regularly emphasized the country’s obligation to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots in developing hydrocarbon resources in maritime jurisdiction areas of Cyprus Island. In short, the authors claim that cognitive priors and socio-cultural ideas embedded in conceptions of Turkish national identity have constructed material benefits at the expense of economic incentives for cooperation between Türkiye and RoC in the region. Causal ideas describe how initial cognitive priors embedded in policy discourse are transferred, or how new ideas are introduced in the social construction of material or normative instruments to achieve policy goals. During 2017-2020 the Turkish policy shifted conflictual security and conflictual economics. The shift in policy preferences can plausibly be explained by cognitive priors and redefined causal ideas in Türkiye’s interactions with Israel, the RoC, and Greece. The causal ideas that diverted the attention of Turkish policy elites were the changing relations with Israel since 2008, the Arab Spring of 2011, Türkiye’s 2015 General elections, and the 2016 coup attempt. Exogenous ideas are the involvement of the EU and US as international actors in conflict resolution. Thus, the preexisting beliefs and locally produced ideas serve as the lenses through which international actors’ ideas and norms are interpreted, and briefly highlight how the stalemate in Türkiye’s relationship with the EU and the political tension between Türkiye and the US have shaped new ideas (i.e., blue homeland) in Ankara’s shift to an increasingly assertive foreign policy. Türkiye’s increasingly independent foreign policy, based on the regional projection of soft power and its accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, have complemented its causal ideas fostering multilateral cooperation and dialogue to protect Turkish Cypriots’ existing and inherent equal rights and interests. While Türkiye diplomatically opposed the RoC’s bilateral Exclusive Economic Zone agreements in 2003, 2007, and 2010, which delimited RoC’s maritime economic zones with Lebanon, Egypt, and Israel, the cooperative framing in its discourse continued. Though in 2008, Turkish and Israeli officials decided to explore the feasibility of a so- called Med-Stream project aimed to connect their countries by five pipelines that would carry water, electricity, fiber optics, natural gas, and oil. However, Türkiye’s cooperative policy between 2003 and 2010 has been lost in the corresponding framing of ‘conflictual security’ in RoC’s discourse towards Türkiye. Further, Türkiye’s causal ideas were redefined when the RoC unilaterally began drilling in the disputed maritime jurisdiction areas in September 2011. Türkiye concluded with its own continental shelf delimitation agreement with the TRNC in the same week, and the TRNC issued a drilling license to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation in September 2011. In other words, since Türkiye’s sovereign rights and thus material interests were directly threatened by the foreign energy firms’ drilling activities on behalf of the RoC in 2011,Türkiye has been forced to defend its rights and has increasingly contested the RoC’s acts—and started redefining its causal idea. The main reason for Türkiye’s policy shift is based on the strategic vision of the Turkish Navy, known as the “blue homeland.” Thus, a memorandum of understanding on the role of Libya in maritime borders delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean resulted between Türkiye and the UN-recognized government of Libya in Tripoli in December 2019, which charted a mutually expansive maritime border between the two states. This diplomatic move aimed to prevent the completion of the proposed East-Med pipeline, transporting natural gas to European markets from Israel and Cyprus. Additionally, the Turkish Navy undertook unprecedentedly extensive navy exercises in the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas. The authors conclude that ideational mechanisms are operating to create specific conditions of cooperation or conflict, and further, that social constructs—the inclusion of ‘us’ and the exclusion of ‘them’—are influential in the patterns of amity or enmity among Türkiye, Greece, and the RoC. The authors note the role of a strong Navy, and claim that deeply rooted nationalist discourses explain Türkiye’s ambitious and independent regional foreign policy. Overall, the authors fail to recognize that Türkiye’s ‘isolation’ from the EMGF is being presented as a ‘lack of cooperation’ despite the member states choosing to exclude Türkiye from the start. By: Razia Wadood, CIGA Senior Research Associate

Avoiding War Over Taiwan

Authors: 14 Task Force Members on US-China Policy Organization/Publisher: 21st Century China Center, University of California San Diego Date/Place: October 12, 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Policy Brief Word Count: 4500 Link: https://china.ucsd.edu/policy/task-force/policy-brief-taiwan.html Keywords: China, Taiwan, US, Taiwan Strait, One-China Policy, Geopolitics, War, Deterrence, South China Sea, Communist Party of China Brief: There is no longer any ambiguity in the US policy towards China, as Washington has identified Beijing as its only competitor in the coming times and believes that it “needs to be reined in” to prevent harm to the world’s most powerful economy and military. One of the main measures that Washington has taken in this regard is targeting Taiwan, an island nation with a population of around 24 million. However, this policy paper strongly advises against escalation and warns that “despite rising tensions, it is both essential and possible to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait. None of the three governments wants war. But to avoid war, all three governments must avoid steps that force the other side to launch a military conflict.” Tensions between Taiwan and mainland China were exacerbated when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made an unannounced visit to Taiwan in August, despite strong objections from Beijing, which does not want Taiwan to be recognized as a separate entity. The US formally recognized China in 1979 and moved its diplomatic mission from Taipei to Beijing, adopting the “One-China Policy” under which Taiwan is considered part of mainland China. This policy was also adopted by the United Nations. However, Taipei has maintained its independence since 1949. The Taiwan Relations Act, which was enacted in 1979, has governed US relations with Taiwan. The Three Communiques, a series of bilateral agreements, have also influenced these ties. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, marked the first time in 25 years that a sitting speaker of the US Congress traveled to the island nation, located south of mainland China across the Taiwan Strait. This visit was seen as the biggest provocation in recent times, and in response, Beijing conducted massive military exercises in the air and at sea around Taiwan and fired missiles, some of which flew over the island. The rule of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, a nationalist and center-left political party, is also seen by Beijing as promoting independence, and as a result, has faced criticism and actions by the Chinese authorities, including the sanctioning of some of its officials. As China’s economic and military influence has expanded, more nations have recently switched their diplomatic relations to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with full-fledged diplomatic relations with only 14 nations. However, Taiwan has never been ruled by Beijing, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed in 1949. The military exercises launched in response to Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan were also seen as China showcasing its military might – it has the world’s largest naval fleet – and the armory it deployed almost blocked off Taiwan’s maritime borders. The US has increased its military activities near Chinese waters, which has led Taiwan to increase its defense relations with the US and place weaponry orders worth $8 billion since the Trump administration. The Biden administration has continued this policy and even ramped up the rhetoric, stating that the US will militarily intervene to help Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Biden’s reiteration of military support to Taiwan has only reinforced the belief that the US has moved from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity with regard to China. This belief is also supported by the fact that the US national security establishment has targeted Chinese firms, including chip manufacturers, and Chinese citizens, linking them to the Chinese military and intelligence agencies. However, the 14 authors of this policy paper remind Washington of theorist Thomas Schelling’s belief that “effective deterrence of the PRC requires not only the credible threat of a forceful response to an attack on Taiwan, but also the credible assurance that if the PRC refrains from attacking Taiwan, interests considered vital to Beijing will not be damaged anyway.” When considering Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy, which many experts describe as the third phase of China’s development since independence, he has insisted on the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China. Xi Jinping’s recent re-election as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief for a record third time is also viewed in a similar light, as China would not want to see destabilization in its economic and military progress despite widespread criticism for its handling of Xinjiang, also known as East Turkistan. Western nations, including the US, which have suffered the devastating impact of COVID-19 with tens of thousands of deaths, have heavily criticized China’s strict pandemic policy, which has apparently led to a low number of deaths (only 5,226 according to Chinese official figures). This policy paper strongly argues against turning the current situation into a full-fledged war, stating that the goal for both sides must be “to keep rising tensions from evolving into a shooting war that would be extremely dangerous and destructive for all sides and that could result in the use of nuclear weapons.” The policy paper also notes that the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland remains at the core of China’s policy, regardless of who leads the government and the CCP. While Beijing has consistently stated that it prefers peaceful reunification, it has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this goal. Beijing has also expressed its desire to control Taiwan under the “One country, Two systems” mechanism. Xi’s recent interactions with military commanders, focusing on combat and war preparedness, show that Beijing’s consistent policy is to fully modernize the People’s Liberation Army by 2027. The policy paper also highlights the different governance models pursued by Beijing and Taipei. While the CCP is the single party that has ruled China since its independence, Taiwan underwent a transition to democracy in 1986 and has a vibrant presidential, legislative, and local elections system. The paper notes that “this is at odds with the Chinese identity that an earlier generation of leaders on Taiwan endorsed, and which Beijing has sought to perpetuate,” citing a June 2022 survey that found 63.7% of respondents in Taiwan identifying as Taiwanese rather than both Chinese and Taiwanese (30.4%). At the same time, the paper states that Beijing has “emerged from a period of strategic caution to assert its interests more strongly by, for example, reclaiming land and building military installations atop seven reefs in the South China Sea, sending coast guard ships daily into waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands whose ownership China contests with Japan, and enrolling many of its neighbors in its Belt and Road Initiative to tie their economies more closely to China’s. The paper adds that “China appears convinced that the United States seeks to prevent China from ever achieving what it sees as its legitimate national objectives, and that US policy on Taiwan is part of that strategy. The US appears convinced that Chinese pressure on Taiwan threatens US values and interests. Taiwan, for its part, has done what it can to consolidate its distinct democratic identity at home and to cultivate de facto international status as an autonomous political entity.” The authors suggest three steps to avoid a war, including asking Taiwan not to declare independence, urging Washington not to recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and preventing Beijing from using military force against Taiwan to compel unification. However, in Washington, many believe that allowing China to control Taiwan would “render impossible the defense of US allies in Asia.” The authors note that “strategic clarity is hardly necessary because (Chinese) Mainland leaders and the PLA already fully expect and plan for US intervention if China acts militarily to take control of Taiwan.” In addition to suggesting an upgrade of its weaponry, including warships and aircraft deployed in the region, the authors argue that Taiwan “must demonstrate its ability to maintain resilience during a blockade and impose high costs on an invading PRC force” and create “deeper reserves of strategic resources like fuel and food in case the PRC elects to blockade the island.” They urge Washington to focus on peace in the Taiwan Strait and reiterate its stance against Taiwan’s independence, and also to involve allies in discussions about “their own stake in peace and stability in cross-Strait relations and the need for them to contribute to a moderate and responsible US strategy to deter mainland belligerence.” The authors also argue against making any “politically advantageous but strategically damaging statements about Taiwan” by US officials and politicians. By: Riyaz ul Khaliq, CIGA Non-resident Research Associate

In Praise of Lesser Evils: Can Realism Repair Foreign Policy?

Author: Emma Ashford Affiliation: Georgetown University and the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at Stimson Center Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: September-October 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Book Review Word Count: 3622 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/praise-lesser-evils-realism-foreign-policy- emma-ashford Keywords: Classical Realism, Structural Realism, Geopolitics, Hyper-rationalism, Morals, Human Factors, War in Ukraine, the US Foreign Policy Brief: In this article, Ashford critically reviews two recent books about Realism in International Relations: “The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought between Germany and the United States” by Matthew Specter, and “Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics” by Jonathan Kirshner. Both books address the limitations and potential of realism, focusing on “Classical Realism”, which is based on a negative view of human nature. Specter’s book examines the origins of classical realism in the pre-World War I period, attempting to uncover what he considers “the malevolent historical roots” of realist philosophy and its terminology. Kirshner’s book, on the other hand, aims to rehabilitate classical realism as a framework for understanding modern geopolitics, and to confront “Structural Realism” (Neorealism), which the author sees as having analytical shortcomings, hyper rationality, and a lack of moral consideration. Structural realism (both defensive and offensive) has come to dominate over other strands of realism and has become synonymous with realism in general. The two books come amid growing questions about the feasibility and relevance of realism in explaining current wars and great power competitions, particularly the Ukrainian war. A number of prominent realists, led by John Mearsheimer, have argued that this war was a result of the structural factor of NATO’s eastward expansion, rather than the aggressive actions of President Putin, which has led to a decline in realism’s popularity. Opponents of realism have also criticized the theory as “meaningless”, as the war in Ukraine seems to demonstrate. This has led to a revival of the historical debate about the ethical dimension of realism, with some arguing that a realistic analysis of the harsh realities of international relations (based on anarchy and states’ pursuit of security and survival, acting in accordance with national interest rather than moral principles) endorses selfish behavior by states rather than providing a positivist diagnosis. So the realists have been accused of having no morals at all, as the debate on the Ukraine war demonstrate. For such reason Robert Gilpin wrote -in 1996- his famous essay, “No One Loves a Political Realist.” The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author sets the context of the growing criticism of realism, which has led to a decline in its popularity after it gained acceptance among elites and the general public due to its often reasonable analysis of the ideological American foreign policy driven by liberal internationalism over the past three decades. Ashford believes that while realism provides useful broad lines of analysis regarding the war in Ukraine (such as the argument that NATO expansion into post-Soviet space contributed significantly to the outbreak of the war), it is flawed in many details. She also argues that the war in Ukraine demonstrates that some realist theories are as simplistic and unhelpful in explaining the conflict as they were during times of global geopolitical upheaval. According to Ashford, the realist theories presented in Specter and Kirshner’s books may not offer new insights, but they do review and update our understanding of the pragmatic and analytical model of classical realism, which may be the most suitable model for our multipolar world. In the second part of the article, Ashford discusses Specter’s critique of classical realism and realism in general. Specter offers an alternative narrative on the origins of realism, examining the intellectual foundations of realism and the biographies of prominent (German and American) founding figures of realism such as Hans Morgenthau, Wilhelm Grewe, and Carl Schmidt. Specter argues that the common narrative of realism, which is promoted by the realist Edward Hallett Carr, is false and that classical realism has dark imperial origins. This narrative claims that classical realism was the intellectual reaction of German-American thinkers such as Morgenthau to the bloody wars of the 20th century. These thinkers rejected the idealism of US President Woodrow Wilson, whose failure to establish a League of Nations that would resolve conflicts between nations through law and norms after World War I led to the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of World War II. In response, these thinkers returned to classic notions of Realpolitik as represented in the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli and embodied by the German leader Otto von Bismarck. Specter disputes this narrative, arguing that the classical realists invented a noble line of great thinkers, such as Thucydides and Hobbes, because their ideas fit the classical realist worldview while avoiding their more questionable historical antecedents from the 19th century imperial geopoliticians. Additionally, Specter refutes the association of realists with “Bismarckian Realpolitik” and tries to prove the connection of realism with an anti-realpolitik imperial German school, “the Weltpolitik,” which is guided by social Darwinism and grants great powers the right to geopolitical expansion and domination. These ideas were embodied in Wilhelm II’s policy in the late 19th century, as well as in Hitler’s policy during World War II. Ashford praises Specter’s genealogical work, but disagrees with some of his findings. She argues that there is nothing wrong with contemporary scholars seeking intellectual clues from history to support their case, and that Specter does not show how contemporary realists’ borrowing from historical concepts undermines the validity of their arguments. While it is true that classical realism formulated its arguments using terms familiar to 20th century imperialists, it also added terms such as “ethical seriousness” and “caution” to its legacy. If there are darker variants of realism in history, this should not invalidate more modern incarnations of the theory, such as “defensive realism”, which is a more moral approach that does not accept immoral principles or the early imperial roots of realism. In the third part of the article, Ashford discusses Kirshner’s “Unwritten Future”. Unlike Specter, Kirshner finds much value in classical realism for the analysis of today’s world and calls on contemporary scholars to revive it due to its analytical richness based on the crucial role of intellectual and internal political factors. He focuses on recent academic works that highlight the role of factors such as honor, pride, and prestige in international affairs, which are core factors for classical realists. He also criticizes structural realism, arguing that it falls into a “hyper-rationalist” view of the world that ignores the moral factor. Neorealism overestimates the rational causes of war and cannot explain anything beyond the stasis of the international system. Kirshner poses a series of problems that structural realists have struggled with recently, such as how to reconcile morality with a fundamentally amoral theory, and the malleability of the concept of the national interest. He also argues that structural realism is better at pointing out the errors of other approaches than at suggesting its own solutions, and cannot fully explain why and when wars happen or how leaders and populations will react when they do. This is why he emphasizes the importance of integrating human factors, which classical realism focuses on, in the analysis of wars. Ashford attributes Kirshner’s perception of the “hyper-rational” language of structural realists to their attempt to make their beliefs about international politics “scientific,” rather than appearing as ideological as they do to their liberal opponents. Liberalists believe that states can rise above power politics and transcend conflict through trade, international institutions, and international law, while realists disagree and see a lot of ideology and political delusions in liberalist arguments. This is why the language of realists is often seen as more rational, less ideological, and lacking in moral consideration. However, Kirshner argues that both realism and liberalism have ideological underpinnings, and that realists should stop pretending to be scientists and return to the messier terrain of classical realism, which is more analytically rich. In the last part of the article, Ashford defends the virtues of realism, emphasizing the need for it to explain international affairs or guide American foreign policy despite its limitations. In response to critics who argue that realism succeeds more in criticism than in offering alternatives, Ashford points out that there is no single political realism. There are different views within the realist paradigm and among realists on various international issues, such as how to deal with China. This has made it difficult for realists to shape policies within the current US administration or its successor. However, realists still put pressure on US administrations to justify their policy choices or adopt more pragmatic and non-ideological policies, despite their complex history with US policymakers. Although both books provide a critical overview of the problems facing realism, they fail to offer alternatives. Ashford believes Kirshner’s book is relatively better in this regard, as it assesses what it would mean in practice to rehabilitate classical realism. For example, it explores the shortcomings of classical realism and incorporates issues of political economy into its framework, as well as incorporating classical realist views into current policy debates to guide them. However, Ashford also criticizes some inconsistencies in Kirshner’s vision. While arguing that great powers have an opportunity to reassess their global commitments, he also calls on the United States to maintain the status quo, claiming that major changes are incompatible with realism’s emphasis on prudence. In contrast, Ashford believes that Specter largely punts on the question of the future of US foreign policy. He makes it clear that realism is not a reasonable path forward, at least not until it incorporates postcolonial, feminist, and critical theoretical insights, because it is too respectful of imperialist approaches, too undemocratic, and too rooted in ethically questionable philosophy. This distaste, according to Ashford, reflects the progressives’ concern about pragmatism and moderation in foreign policy when these concepts come into conflict with universal values. Realists are well aware of these problematic issues. In foreign policy, realism is often a choice between the lesser of evils. Realism does not condone “political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible,” as Morgenthau wrote. Pretending that moral principles or values can override all constraints of power and interest is not political realism; it is political fantasy. Finally, Ashford believes that with the world’s shift towards multipolarity, realism will once again become more important for the conduct of US foreign policy. By: Djallel Khechib, CIGA Senior Research Associate

Title: Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey

Author: Berk Esen Affiliation: Sabancı University, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Organization/Publisher: SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs Date/Place: September 22, 2022/Berlin, Germany Type of Literature: Article Word Count: 4500 Link: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/post-2023-election-scenarios-in-turkey Keywords: Türkiye, Political Parties, Election Scenarios, Economic Crisis, Foreign Policy, Post- Erdogan Era Brief: In his analysis of the post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey, Berk Esen argues that the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, set to take place by June 2023, will mark the first time in Erdogan’s 20 years in power that he is not the clear favorite due to economic struggles and divisions within his AKP party. Six opposition parties have united to select a joint presidential candidate with a chance of defeating Erdogan, but even if they succeed, the new government will face significant challenges, including establishing a “meritocratic bureaucracy,” revising diplomatic and economic policies, and restoring the parliamentary system of government. Esen also discusses the current state of the Turkish political and economic landscape and the potential for election fraud. He highlights the significant challenges that a post-Erdoğan government would need to tackle. According to Esen, the AKP’s decreasing popularity and poor performance in opinion polls can be attributed to the economic crisis in Turkey, which threatens the party’s ability to secure more than 50% of the vote share in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. The opposition parties, including the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Future Party (GP), the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), and the Nation Alliance (consisting of the Turkish Nationalist Good Party (İyiP), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the Democrat Party (DP)), are more united than in previous elections and have a greater chance of defeating Erdogan and the AKP. Esen anticipates that the election will be highly polarized, with the ruling bloc having control over resources, media, and bureaucracy, and warns that Erdogan may resort to repression against Kurdish groups or military action to divert attention from economic issues and bolster his candidacy. However, he believes that such actions would not be sufficient to halt the decline in Erdogan’s support or prevent the rise of the opposition. Esen also raises concerns about the fairness of the election, given the government’s control over media, bureaucracy, and the judiciary, which could make it difficult for a smooth transfer of power to take place. Esen discusses several post-election scenarios in Turkey. It is expected that the ruling bloc will not be able to maintain its parliamentary majority, but Erdogan may still win the presidential election and be confronted with an opposition-dominated parliament. Under the presidential system, this would not pose a significant challenge, as the president has more power and the parliament has fewer checks on their authority. If the opposition were to win the presidential election, the parliamentary composition would depend on the outcome of the presidential race. It is difficult to predict the allocation of seats between the ruling People’s Alliance and the opposition Nation’s Alliance based on opinion polls. The decision of the opposition parties to participate in the election through joint lists under the main opposition parties (the CHP and the İyiP) or to run on their own parties could also impact the allocation of seats. The potential presence of another alliance, such as the HDP forming an alliance with far-leftist parties like the Worker’s Party of Turkey (TIP), could also influence the parliamentary allocation of seats. The HDP, which received about 11.7% of the votes in 2018 and is expected to continue performing well based on opinion polls, could serve as a key party in balancing the two large blocs in parliament. However, the increasing support for the anti-refugee populist Victory Party (ZP) could disrupt the opposition vote if they manage to attract public support but do not reach the parliamentary threshold of 7% of the vote. Another scenario is Erdogan losing the presidency to a candidate from the Nation Alliance. In this case, the AKP would face difficulties, as they would be denied access to public resources, which could impact the party’s functioning and Erdogan’s ability to lead the party in opposition for a long period of time, given the personalistic nature of the party and its weak institutions. Esen emphasizes the severe challenges that a post-Erdoğan government would face. One of the top priorities for the new government would be to restore the parliamentary system and transfer the extensive powers of the presidency back to the parliament. The new government would also need to address the economic crisis and work towards sustainable development. While the opposition parties have a strong team of economists who could develop a recovery plan, it is uncertain which party would be responsible for the economic portfolio in the new government. Additionally, not all parties have fully developed their economic programs, such as the CHP, which is the only left- leaning party in the alliance. Another challenge for a post-Erdoğan government would be the development of a new foreign policy that moves away from Erdogan’s “revisionist agenda,” which has caused tensions with the EU, NATO, and neighboring countries. The new government would need to restore Turkey’s international position and improve relationships with the EU, NATO, and its surrounding countries. Esen suggests that a new leadership may be able to win goodwill from EU governments towards Turkey, though it may take time to fully repair bilateral relations, particularly with issues such as Cyprus, border tensions with Greece, and the refugee crisis. However, the opposition has not yet developed a clear vision for maintaining relations with Russia and Iran, which could overlap with Turkish-Syrian relations given the complex dynamic between the three countries. Major opposition parties like the CHP and İyiP have expressed a willingness to open channels with the al-Assad regime in order to reach an agreement for the military pullout in exchange for the return of Syrian refugees. Additionally, the opposition parties have different foreign policy agendas, which could hinder the development of a consistent foreign policy and diplomacy. Another significant challenge for the new government would be developing a migration policy that addresses the issue of hosting a large number of refugees (nearly six million) in Turkey, particularly amid the current economic crisis and increasing sentiment against the long-term settlement of Syrian refugees in Turkey. While most of the opposition parties have included the refugee issue in their programs and have similar agendas regarding the status of Syrians in Turkey, they have not made it a “main campaign issue.” This has opened the door for the anti-refugee Victory Party (ZP), a single-issue party focused on expelling Syrians, to gain public interest, with estimates of support ranging from 1-4% in public polls. The opposition parties’ tendency to advocate for the voluntary return of Syrians is driven by a fear of losing votes to anti-refugee parties and a desire to shift the public’s attention to the economic crisis. However, the voluntary return of refugees is not a practical solution due to the Syrian government’s unwillingness, the refugees’ unwillingness, and the high cost of settlement in Turkish-controlled areas. Esen suggests that the new government needs to develop new policies and instruments to address the issue, including “resettlement in third countries, repatriation, and integration.” Reforming the civil service is another challenge for a post-Erdoğan government, as it would involve replacing partisans in the civil service, military, and judiciary, who may resist the new political agenda, particularly in bureaucracy and military institutions. The opposition parties recognize the need for reform and change, but they are not in agreement on the mechanism for reform or the cadres who should replace current officials. Additionally, the opposition parties, with the exception of the two splinter parties from the AKP, have a shortage of experienced cadres due to their exclusion from public office under AKP governments. Overall, the opposition alliance has not yet developed comprehensive policies on issues such as the economy, refugee crisis, and civil service reform. However, they will need to make tough decisions and address their divisions on various issues, including foreign affairs, the Kurdish dilemma, and public office appointments. They will also need to restore the parliamentary system through constitutional amendments, taking into account the history of weak coalition governments in Turkey. Finally, Esen notes that in a post-Erdoğan era, Turkey may seek rapprochement with the EU, and the EU could play a constructive and supportive role in the transition period, including monitoring elections and cooperating in areas such as the economy, migration, security, and climate to ensure mutual benefits. By: Yomna Süleyman, CIGA Research Associate

Renewing the American Regime: U.S.– China Competition beyond Ukraine

Author: Ashley J. Tellis Affiliation: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Organization/Publisher: Center for Strategic & International Studies Date/Place: September 12, 2022/USA Type of Literature: Report Number of Pages: 20 Link: https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewing-american-regime-us%E2%80%93china- competition-beyond-ukraine Keywords: Capacity, Containment, Hegemony, Domestic Politics Brief: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has disrupted the international order established after World War II. This order is reliant on American power and dominance, and the international system and its benefits rely on American hegemony due to a lack of alternatives. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the rise of China pose a direct threat to the American-led international order on both domestic and international levels. To protect itself and its allies, the US is maintaining its hegemony over the European and Asian rimland. The challenges to US hegemony require it to take a proactive stance in order to shape trends in its favor. The main goal is to maintain the US’ position as the most powerful country in the world by maintaining peak military capabilities, technological innovation, economic superiority, and serving as a model for other countries to emulate. No other country has achieved the level of power the US has, allowing it to maintain its hegemony. To retain this position, the US must pursue three tasks: preserving liberal democracy both at home and abroad by spreading its ideals and using minimal force to support its institutions; protecting the global economic system and free trade relations; and physically protecting its allies through military force and Hegemonic stability is not self-sustaining and requires strong leadership and moderation in decision making based on a comprehensive perspective, which the US has been lacking in the post-Cold War era. The complex challenges posed by China, particularly in the areas of ideology, technology, and economy, can only be effectively addressed through a maximalist approach that puts adversaries on the defensive and creates an unfavorable balance of power. However, for this approach to be successful, the domestic scene must be maintained in good shape, as negative developments within the US can undermine its ability to project power abroad. It is crucial to address increasing polarization, declining domestic mobility, and to reaffirm the American ideal of pursuing the common good. The weakening of social groups that support hegemony makes it more difficult to face the challenges posed by China, especially when these challenges require a unified domestic base. Communicating the importance of these issues to the American public and building support for a maximalist approach requires meaningful communication between the leadership and the public. However, the presence of President Trump in power demonstrated how a president can use rising public disinterest in hegemonic power to limit US foreign policy and damage the country’s global standing. In addition, material support from the public, particularly constituencies that support an active foreign policy, is crucial for hegemonic foreign policy. Globalization has contributed to rising inequality and a lack of adequate social safety nets in the US, leading to reduced social mobility compared to other liberal order countries. Revitalizing the American regime at home also depends on rejuvenating its political life around the ideal of the common good, rather than focusing on the private benefit of certain constituencies. In its current situation, the US needs to utilize all of its resources to protect its own interests and those of its allies. This involves engaging with the concerns of states within its sphere of influence, particularly in Europe, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Middle East. To address the challenges posed by China, the US should focus on two projects: encouraging greater European participation in their own defense and building an effective coalition in East Asia to balance China. Europe is too far away to effectively address the China challenge on its own, so they should prioritize improving their military and economic security to give the US more room to focus on countering China. The US should also transform its East Asian alliances into a more effective security network. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a useful diplomatic tool, but it lacks the agreements to become a strong military alliance. Japan and Australia also have significant shortfalls in their military power to fully contribute to the Quad. In terms of the US position in East Asia, there needs to be a reassessment of the current strategic ambiguity. The US should augment its support for Taiwan while maintaining the One China policy by reinforcing Taiwanese de facto independence before it is too late, and clearly stating that any attempt to annex the island by force will be met with American retaliation. To strengthen American leadership, it is necessary to adopt an economic engagement strategy that is suitable for the growing power competition. China has benefited greatly from the open market, which led the Trump administration to withdraw from global economic leadership. The Biden administration has worked to reverse the anti- internationalist tendencies of Trump, but there are still concerns about China’s exploitation of global trade. Additionally, neither political party in the US is interested in expanding international trade, which has deprived the World Trade Organization (WTO) of much- needed reforms and has geopolitical implications for forming alliances. Another factor that hinders the US’ ability to recalibrate its trade policies is the domestic scene, as new agreements can lead to domestic discontent. avoiding unnecessary wars. Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was one of the most significant partial free trade agreements at the time. Domestic politics have also prevented the Biden administration from seriously considering returning to the TPP. Agreements like the TPP would have allowed for deeper economic integration among US allies, with higher standards that could have limited China’s advantages in global trade by creating economic networks that are closed off to China. On the military aspect of containment, the US has the capability to project power in the Indo-Pacific region and significantly hinder Chinese influence, but there are not enough resources being directed towards increasing US presence in this way. The administration is hesitant to make radical changes to the budget allocation between different branches of the military and cannot simply increase the budget due to domestic constraints on military spending. The future consequences of this inability to increase military presence in the Indo-Pacific region are dangerous, as the threat of Chinese or Russian influence goes beyond regional undermining of the status quo in Europe or East Asia. The real danger is the potential inability of the American political system to understand that the current challenges are threatening the liberal international order as a whole, and that the defenses put up against this threat may be inadequate. By: Omar Fili, CIGA Research Assistant

How not to Deal with a Rising China: A US Perspective

Author: Joseph S. Nye Jr. Affiliation: the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Organization/Publisher: Journal of International Affairs Date/place: September 6, 2022/New York, USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 17 Link: https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1635/6686624?searchresult=1 Keywords: US-China Relations, Power Competition, US-China Interdependence, China’s Rise Brief: In this journal article, Joseph S. Nye Jr. poses the question of whether China will displace the United States as a major power. Throughout the article, he attempts to answer the question of how the US should behave towards China and how it should react to China’s rise, in a way that will shape China’s behavior and environment without resorting to war. Many people believe that China is declining due to factors such as its failure to avoid the middle- income trap, its declining demographics, and low factory productivity. However, the future is uncertain and will depend in part on the strategy that the United States pursues, according to the author. According to Nye, realism has traditionally been the dominant model of international relations. He discusses various forms of realism, such as Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism and John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, as well as alternative versions that focus on the balance of power between a hegemonic power and a rising competitor. The author also mentions various historical metaphors that have been used to describe the current state of relations between the United States and China, but admits that these metaphors can be oversimplified or misused. He specifically mentions the Thucydides trap, the New Cold War, and the 1914 Sleepwalker as three relevant metaphors. The Thucydides trap refers to the fear that a rising power (in this case, China) can instill in a dominant power (the United States). This concept has often been applied to past events, such as the relationship between Britain and Germany before World War I. However, the author argues that the gap in power between the United States and China is larger than that between Britain and Germany, and that the relationship between these two countries was more complex than simply a response to a rising power. The author also notes that other factors, such as Russia’s rise and the growth of Slavic nationalism, influenced Germany’s decision to go to war. In addition, the author discusses the role of American foreign policy in influencing the level of fear between the two countries and the potential for misjudgments that could lead to the Thucydides trap. The author also addresses the issue of hegemonic transition and asks whether China will be able to provide global public goods, such as climate finance, stability, and freedom of the seas. The author points out that China is currently the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces and heads four important UN agencies, and is also building its Belt and Road Initiative and collaborating on efforts to address climate change. Nye discusses the metaphor of the “New Cold War,” which is often used to describe the relationship between the US and China. However, Nye disagrees with the use of this metaphor and points out differences between the US and China, as opposed to the US and the Soviet Union, which make it an inappropriate comparison. Nye also notes that attempts to economically detach the US from China would come with significant economic risks and costs. In contrast to the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which was primarily driven by military and ideological threats, Nye believes that the US must consider its allies and the combined wealth of western democracies in order to address the challenges of dealing with China in the current globalized, interdependent world. Nye argues that “the politics of global interdependence involves power with others as well as over others.” Nye’s third and final metaphor is that of the “1914 sleepwalker,” which he believes is the most applicable to the current situation. This metaphor refers to the period leading up to World War I, when all major powers were anticipating a Balkan war that would shape the balance of power. Nye emphasizes several key features of this time period, including the rise of nationalism, which posed a threat to both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the rise of pride and arrogance that led to a lack of moderation. Additionally, Nye notes the role of German policy, which was both eager and determined, yet unclear. In light of these historical lessons, Nye argues that it is important to stay alert to the rise of nationalism in China and populist nationalism in the US. He also points out the outdated nature of the US’s “double deterrence” policy, which aims to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and China from using force, and warns against reacting to tensions by blocking assets or cutting off trade with China. Instead, he advises finding ways to prevent a cold or hot war between the US and China. Following the 1992 elections, some politicians in Washington came to believe that the Cold War was over and focused instead on the perceived threat from Japan. Joseph Nye believed at the time that this issue was exaggerated and that the real challenge of China’s rise was being overlooked and underestimated. Nye argues that, while the US based its policy on realism in dealing with Japan, it took a more liberal approach to trade. Therefore, a strategy of containment would not have been effective and would have jeopardized the US’s relationships with its allies. Instead, Nye suggests that the US should try to shape China’s environment in order to influence its behavior. While it may be unrealistic to expect the US to change China’s entire political system into a democratic and liberal state, a more realistic goal would be to coexist on terms that are beneficial to US interests and values. Some believe that China is showing signs of change and opening up, while others believe that these efforts are simply strategic moves. Nye argues that, while terrorism is a significant issue, it is less important than great power competition in the current global landscape. He suggests that a strategy focused solely on terrorism could have two problems: it could lump together various types of states, leading to an underestimation of powers like Russia, and it could overlook threats from ecological globalization, such as climate change, which could have significant economic costs and potentially lead to war. Instead, Nye advises the US to adopt a strategy of “competitive coexistence” with China, viewing it as a “cooperative rivalry.” He suggests that, by working together and coordinating their policies, the US, Japan, and Europe can create a rules-based international order that protects their interests and shapes Chinese behavior. Nye also highlights several advantages that the US has over China, including its geography, energy resources, financial power, and technological innovation, but notes that China is investing in research and development and aims to lead the fourth industrial revolution. According to Nye, the US should maintain its alliance with Japan and not halt all immigration, as demonizing China and starting a Cold War would hinder cooperation on ecological interdependence and potentially lead to the growth of nuclear weapons. Nye also notes the challenges of political polarization and dealing with social and economic problems, as well as the rise of populist nativism, which could reduce immigration and undermine support for international institutions and alliances. Additionally, he highlights the importance of having a clear vision and values in crafting a successful and necessary strategy for the US. This approach should include both realism and discretion, but also a focus on democratic values and human rights in order to effectively wield soft power. In conclusion, Nye argues that a successful strategy for the US must begin within its own borders by maintaining democratic institutions and investing in research and development to stay current with technological advances. The US should also be open to the world, while structuring its military and strengthening its ties with allies. To succeed, the US must not succumb to fear of weakening or decline and should continue to cooperate with China on transnational interdependence. Ultimately, Nye offers guidance to US policymakers on how to approach the challenges of dealing with China in an era of globalization and interdependence. He emphasizes the importance of cooperation, especially in issues like climate change and global pandemics, and points out the need for cooperation that has been demonstrated in the past couple of years with the spread of COVID-19. However, Nye does not advocate for a focus on regime change in China, which he sees as unrealistic. Instead, he suggests that the US and its allies should aim to shape China’s environment and influence its behavior to align with their interests, recognizing that regime change could be a welcomed outcome if it occurs. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern

Title: Horn of Africa Emerging as a Strategic Pivot of The Indian Ocean Region: Need for Repackaging SAGAR 2.0

Author: Somen Banerjee

Affiliation: National Cadet Corps (Indian Navy), Odisha Directorate, Bhubaneshwar, India
Indian Ocean Research Group Inc; Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) /
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region
August 25, 2021/ the UK
Type of Literature:
Journal Article
Number of Pages:
India, the Horn of Africa, Indian Ocean, Geostrategic Pivot, Human Security, Development

By analyzing the compatibilities between India’s goal of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the United Nations’ agenda of Sustainable Peace, the author aims to provide a framework for India’s geopolitical involvement in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa has emerged as a strategic pivot, a region that offers the geographical cause for shaping the universal course of history. The Horn of Africa has become the strategic hub of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) due to the growing presence and interests of extra-regional powers, its unique admixture of conflicts, superpower competition, and contestation between the Middle Eastern States; and, it straddles one of the busiest waterways of maritime trade. India—with the 6th largest Economy in the world—must broaden and deepen its involvement in the region’s geopolitics by harmonizing security and development to contribute to the region and achieve sustainable peace positively.
The author examines the challenges and prospects of working with the geopolitically complex region of the Horn of Africa to achieve a sustainable peace, and strives to address the central questions: What factors make the Horn of Africa an IOR strategic pivot? What distinguishes this area from the rest of Africa? The author examines India’s challenges as a security player in any region, since India has created conflicts from arbitrary border-drawing and shown staggering disregard for social affiliations. Its weak central government has exacerbated and even weaponized these fault lines, causing societal unrest and civil disputes. Accordingly, it must be questioned whether India’s SAGAR framework—which it has used for marine governance to integrate security and development—has the capacity to be implemented in the Horn of Africa, which is rapidly changing. The author analyses the geopolitical significance of the Horn as a pivot of the Indian Ocean Region to determine SAGAR’s feasibility as a foreign policy plan. The crucial point that the author tries to convey is that orthodox politics no longer determines national stature or power. Instead, the new sources of a country’s international leverage are equally centered on technology, connection, climate change, investment, and trade. The Horn of Africa is not an exception. The region’s security architecture has been shaped by the military presence of several governments and the ever-expanding economic networks in the region. While the U.S., China, the European Union, Japan, and France have emerged as prominent security actors, Russia and the Middle Eastern governments have made considerable inroads in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa is becoming a strategic pivot for the Indian Ocean Region and a microcosm of anarchism in global politics. The security architecture of the area is being increasingly impacted by structural reasons, which has implications for the whole world, as the commercial and military presence of foreign players continues to grow.
The Horn of Africa’s geostrategic relevance has increased significantly over the past ten years due to the fierce military and geoeconomics struggle. Therefore, it will soon become a strategic pivot in the IOR. Although geoeconomics rivalry in the region has brought developmental outcomes and has boosted economic growth in some countries of the Horn region, its great mass of people still lack access to even the most basic human necessities. More should be done. In this regard, Japan’s and France’s geopolitical approaches can be exemplary as the two have allocated resources that support the development and human security in the Horn of African states. India has, ironically, been an outlier in the region. The deployment of Indian soldiers to serve the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have little political influence on the regional security architecture. The U.N.’s mission of sustainable peace is supported through Grant Assistance for Grassroot Human Security Projects (GGP), which focuses on human security issues. Therefore, ideal geopolitical involvement in the Horn should combine essential human security and development elements. The network of connections that influence the Horn’s political landscape results from competition between Middle Eastern governments and interactions between significant foreign powers. Different local, regional, and international incentives exist for every foreign participant to be present in the Horn. The geopolitical ups and downs have not affected India’s relationship with the Horn; its indulgence has mainly been restricted to anti-piracy patrols at sea and peacekeeping missions on land. However, the expectation of global leadership has increased with India’s nomination to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the years 2021 and 2022. The best approach to getting the world’s respect is to show that you have global importance. India would thus need to exert tremendous effort in the Indian Ocean Region’s littorals by focusing on human security and sustainable development. In this regard, India might realign its Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) philosophy using the conceptual framework provided by the United Nations’ objective for sustainable peace. In terms of development, the World Bank has designated Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea as Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) for the fiscal year 2021. The obstacles to advancement are just as common in Africa as in the Horn. Multidimensional inequalities and unfair wealth distribution are manifested in the region’s vulnerability to widespread poverty. Additionally, horizontal disparities based on racial, gender, linguistic, religious, and cultural identities feed societal unrest. Other concerning megatrends that influence the economic, political, and social environment are the COVID-19 pandemic, rapid population rise, migration, and urbanization. Forecasts indicate that the temperature will increase and that coastal regions will experience more frequent flooding. Risks associated with disasters would result in the loss of infrastructure, crops, and livelihoods, which might cause civil instability and mass migration. Furthermore, by 2050, the majority would probably be forced to live in urban slums due to the high population increase. Most people in the Horn experience structural and physical violence in their daily lives because there is no political leviathan Ethiopia’s extraordinary economic development over the past two decades has brought about stability and regional collaboration, encouraging peace and security. The Horn of Africa is blessed with abundant natural resources, a sizable agricultural area, and the Nile, one of the world’s longest rivers. Fossil fuels, mineral resources, and fishing are significant economic contributors. Any attempt to sustainably engage the Horn would require a regional strategy with Ethiopia at its center. China’s Djibouti-Ethiopia model is instructive in this regard.
Human security, broadly described as being free from both fear and hunger, is closely tied to many facets of economic progress. The Horn of Africa yearns for a lasting peace that places people at the heart of prosperity and security, in contrast to its people being exploited by colonial powers who have continued interfering in the region that has resulted in decades of strife. Regional integration seems to be the most practical plan for quick
expansion given the current Horn conditions. The best course of action is to invest in the economic corridors that connect Ethiopia with its maritime neighbors. However, this development ought to result in peace and security for people. By definition, SAGAR, the foreign policy concept of India, coincidentally combines security and development. But is it a workable plan for fostering long-term peace in the Horn of Africa?
Growing evidence suggests that the geopolitical rivalry and direct and indirect international interventions by extra-regional or outside actors have been ineffective in resolving complex and protracted conflicts in the global south, but instead enabled patrimonial politics and
authoritarianism. Inequality, lack of opportunities, discrimination, and exclusion have also fueled complaints and perceptions of injustice. In most African governments, poor governance leads to transnational crimes such as terrorism, violent extremism, human trafficking, forced migration, and illicit money flows. To take the author’s recommendations seriously would require that geopolitical interests and rivalry should prioritize societaldevelopment and security over militarism and partisan politics in the target region. Extra-regional actors must follow human-centered geopolitical approaches to bring about sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. If geopolitical players follow the author’s presumptions, the Horn of Africa’s politics and strategic position may favorably influence peace, development, democracy, property, and human security. However, if these presumptions are not taken into account and geopolitics in the Horn of Africa continue to be characterized by militarization and mutually-exploitive politics between local actors and their international partners, the region will continue to be plagued by state collapse, civil war, human trafficking, and terrorism.

The Horn of Africa has been increasingly important over the past 20 years, and the area has begun to serve as the IOR’s strategic pivot. India must thus shift its attention to this important geographic location. Because of the ongoing violence in the area, the smaller nations are more susceptible to political and social upheavals. In this context, Ethiopia’s demographic dividend, political influence, and geographic center give optimism for regional prosperity and integration. As a result, the Horn of Africa’s regional integration, with Ethiopia at its center, is a workable way to promote economic development and stability. According to the logic presented in this article, India’s SAGAR foreign policy philosophy, which conflates security with development, is consistent with the U.N.’s goal of sustainable peace. SAGAR, however, is unduly concerned with maritime governance in its current form. India’s approach to the region should consider good governance, growth, and human security. India has to contribute to global concerns, not just in word only, but actually build its worldwide presence to impact global consciousness visibly. While moving forward would require risk-taking, India should avoid misrepresenting caution and hesitation as wise decisions. Undoubtedly, the Horn of Africa poses a variety of challenges. Still, it also presents India with tremendous potential to position itself as an advocate for international stability and security, particularly in light of its participation in the U.N. Security Council in 2021–2022. India must thus redesign SAGAR Version 2.0 for the Horn of Africa by coordinating its foreign policy with the U.N.’s objectives for sustainable peace.

By: Jemal Muhamed, CIGA Senior Research Associate

The Hollow Order: Rebuilding an International System that Works

Author: Philip Zelikow Affiliation: Professor of History at the University of Virginia. Former U.S. Diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. He has worked for five US presidential administrations including National Security Council staff for President George H.W. Bush (1989-1991), and member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board for President Bush (2001-03) and for President Obama (2011-13). Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: July/August 2022, Washington, USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Word Count: 4933 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system? Keywords: New World Order, Ukraine, Washington, Russia, China Brief: After working for five US Presidential administrations as a career diplomat and then Intelligence Advisor, the author now believes the current world order needs to be rebuilt and reconstructed. In this new system, the US’s role would be central but not domineering, and power would be shared with partners and allies; it would be a world of free trade with partners that share the same values. The author is critical of the US’s high defense spending, which satisfies more those in power rather than supporting any positive strategies, much like the European empires that built a system to satisfy mainly their interests. Furthermore, the US and other states have withdrawn from trade agreements and have disregarded international institutions, and have not taken any action to improve the economy or global health. The author’s main idea is one of cooperation, crafting ideal and practical solutions that would benefit broad interests. The author sees a new system based on a cooperative world, which according to him is a new idea. After WWII and the Cold War, the system that had emerged was a divided one. International policymakers commenced to build new institutions and improve old ones. They believed that Washington’s role in this new system would be essential but not domineering, that partnerships would be made to combine its powers with other allies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, policymakers were careful not to hurt Russia’s pride, while the US began to withdraw most of its forces from Europe. Since then, the world order and its institutions have been working on autopilot. There were some issues that plagued Europe, mostly security issues. George W. Bush, for instance, urged Ukraine to receive NATO membership in 2008; however, other allies such as Germany and France blocked any further progress on the issue, which created a division among NATO members. Here, the author explains that the crisis which happened in 2014 was not due to NATO, but rather was induced by Ukraine’s venture to associate itself with the EU. Based on what the author states, Putin only uses NATO to conceal his real concern—Ukraine becoming a democratic independent state. The author then addresses the issue of climate change and its policies. The main international response since the Earth Summit (held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992) has been to commit to decarbonization. However, most of the assurances and promises made by states have been a façade. Europe, which is the most outspoken on the issue, has become more and more dependent on fossil fuels, especially from Russia. The fuel crisis in Europe is acutely visible after the war in Ukraine started. On another note, economically, the United States has been incapable to join trade agreements due to domestic opposition. Many countries have incurred enormous amounts of debt and the current system is unable to organize a way to provide vital and necessary relief. The author emphasizes the impact of this system on global health and how certain events have shown its lack of success, notably the SARS epidemic of 2013 and more recently the COVID-19 outbreak. These two outbreaks highlight concerns about the role in informing the world about the seriousness of the cases, and revealed the weakness of international organizations in charge, such as the World Health Organization. It also showed that when it came to a so-called “global response”, major powers were only concerned with their own self-interest. Thus, the author states that in a new world order, policymakers would have to address the failures of the existing system, and the way to achieve this is to actually practice problem-solving. The first step is to focus on the crisis in Ukraine and its reconstruction. The G-7 allied countries must arrange for Ukraine’s accession to the EU. However, the author also states that the US and Europe must reevaluate their defense strategy and undertake military planning beyond Europe, and not only focus on Ukraine. The issue of Ukraine affects many aspects of diplomacy—one being the disagreement over Taiwan’s sovereignty. When Russia started its invasion against Ukraine, the author claims that China sees this as an opportunity to prove its sovereignty. Accordingly, both Japan and the US must defend Taiwan if Beijing took any action. This reality must be taken into account, and Japan and the US must leave no doubt that they would come to the rescue. The author tries to highlight the current system’s problems that the war in Ukraine has made visible. For instance, he mentions that there should be more determined and cooperative action on the transition to clean energy, which will require a process of finding different and secure supplies of minerals needed for renewable sources. Moreover, the G-7 must work on fighting Russian aggression against Ukraine, but the author cautions they must study how their actions would affect developing states. Furthermore, coordination between the US and Europe must improve. Especially when another pandemic hits, the US government must work with its partners in developing and distributing vaccines. The author emphasizes the decentralization of this new order. Because many are united by their resentment of the US and will try to discredit this new system, it should not be limited only to the US and its traditional allies. It should be more inclusive and attempt to welcome other states at the table such as India and possibly even China. However, China would be more difficult to achieve, especially after its partnership with Putin and its grouping with states that include Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. The author comments on China’s view that US policy is to cut off China’s growth. Because China’s strategy is national self-sufficiency, the author believes that this is not at odds with having the world’s most populous country in this new world order. Rather, it would be effective and of utmost benefit to the system. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern

Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power

Authors:Sir Lawrence Freedman, KCMG, CBE Affiliation: Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London (1982-2014) Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: July/August 2022/USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Word Count: 4867 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya, Putin, Forces, Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelenskyy Brief: Russia is trying to hit hard but Ukraine isn’t silent as well. Russia had planned to seize Ukraine from the Kherson Airport at Chornobaivka, an important point for its upcoming offensive; but the operation wasn’t accurate as the Russians had planned, as Ukraine started to defend itself by armed drones and destroyed the Russian helicopters that were transferring supplies from Crimea. But Ukraine didn’t stop there; it also destroyed another 30 Russian helicopters in March. Ukraine’s attacks have continued to destroy more and more Russian supplies and weapons. Despite the result of these events, Russia apparently didn’t have a strategic plan to fix all of this, but instead stuck to its original orders, which led to a disaster. Because of the huge numbers of soldiers that Russia has been using to invade Ukraine, many leaders and politicians have questioned how Ukraine has held in front of these forces. Military power isn’t always about the skills and the kind of weapons you are using, but it also includes a good and organized leadership that can lead the troop wisely. According to the author, Putin has made the classical mistake of underestimating the enemy and what it is capable of. Military leaders need to understand that their decisions must be wisely made because depending on these decisions/orders, the fate of their country will be decided. The author mentions some main standards that every military leader must have: deep professional knowledge, the ability to use resources efficiently, good communication skills, the ability to get on with others, a sense of moral purpose and responsibility, and a willingness to care for subordinates. Not all subordinates will obediently carry out orders. Even the most careful field officer may disregard orders that are occasionally improper because they may be founded on insufficient and out-of-date intelligence. In other situations, implementation might be feasible but foolish because there may be a more effective approach to accomplish the same goals. However, to avoid such conflicts, the modern command philosophy practiced in the West has tended to encourage subordinates to take the initiative to handle the current situation; commanders trust those involved in the action to make the crucial decisions while remaining prepared to intervene if things go wrong. Ukrainian armies have adopted this strategy, while Russia adheres to a more hierarchical leadership paradigm. Although the local initiative is theoretically permitted by Russian ideology, the current command structures discourage subordinates from defying their superiors and taking a chance. The author says that Russia’s command problem in Ukraine is a consequence of current political leadership more than a military philosophy. As autocrats frequently surround themselves with advisors who share their political views and favor loyalty above competence among their senior military leaders, the author suggests that authorities and officers in Russia must be cautious before questioning superiors. The Russian military has always been a powerful and strategic one. An example was what happened in Chechnya in 1994-96 by Russian president Boris Yeltsin. The Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev assured the president that by sending the Russian military into the Chechen capital of Grozny as soon as possible, it would put an end to Chechnya’s attempt to break away from the Russian Federation. But because Russia underestimated what Chechnya could do, it lost the first attack on Chechnya. Three years later, Putin decided to resume the Chechnya war, but this time with a complete preparation of Russian forces. Despite all the efforts that had been made by Putin to be a powerful politician/president, his relations with the West have always been under threat because of many reasons, one of them (maybe the biggest) is Ukraine. As the Ukraine has come under the control of the West, Putin decided to join Crimea to his control. This confirmed his status as a shrewd supreme commander, and brought him great support from the local people; but he was always moving with a sensitivity alert without violence, and as violence occurred he had to protect the people in danger. Putin didn’t stop there, but began a bigger battle in the Donbas region. When Putin saw that he could be defeated by the Ukrainians, the Kremlin sent in regular Russian forces. Although the author claims that Russia didn’t face a real threat from the Ukrainian army and says that this move wasn’t necessary, he acknowledges Putin’s wanting to be on the safe side, especially as fighting continued despite the Minsk agreement being signed in 2014. The author discusses Putin’s strategies to protect himself and his state, that it can be said how the more Putin says that he isn’t using violence, the more he is actually using it. After Putin failed in trying to use the Russian enclaves to influence Kyiv to return to Moscow’s influence and never again consider joining NATO or the EU, he used Ukraine’s weaknesses and needs to convince the world that Kyiv needed to change its government. Such a strategy needs a strict commitment from the armed forces and strong movements. The recent Russian military action in Syria, which has effectively supported the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, and recent attempts to modernize Russia’s armed forces had increased Putin’s confidence. But the war hasn’t succeeded for Putin because he didn’t listen to the warning that came from different perspectives in his government and leaders, confirming that Ukraine is stronger than it was eight years ago and that the Russian numbers weren’t enough to invade all of the Ukraine. Consequently, the main flaws of the Russian campaign were exposed as soon as the invasion began. The first indication that Putin’s plan wasn’t going as it should was what happened at the Hostomel airport, near Kyiv, where the Russians faced more Ukrainian attacks than they expected. Putin’s initial strategic oversight was believing Ukraine to be both helpless against Russian forces and incapable to participate in anti-Russian operations. After Putin made his move and initiated the invasion, he appeared unwilling to adjust to the new situation as the invasion paused, adamant that everything was going according to plan and on schedule. On the other hand, the initial aim of the Russian operation was rejected by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who also rejected offers from the United States and other Western nations to be transferred to safety in order to establish a government in exile. In addition to surviving, he has remained in Kyiv, has been outspoken, and has rallied his supporters while urging Western countries to continue providing additional military and financial help. Putin’s position, and his warning to the West not to oppose what he is doing in the Ukraine, has remained the same. In the new offensive, which began in earnest in mid-April without the Russian forces taking any break for a full re-preparing, Russian forces made few gains, while Ukrainian counterattacks nibbled away at their positions. With Putin out of choices following a continuous spate of bad command decisions, numerous observers started to notice that Russia had become entrenched in an unwinnable conflict that it dared not lose, as the attack in Ukraine neared the end of its third month. The Ukraine-Russia war remains a debatable case of how a powerful state like Russia cannot succeed in winning over a weaker state like Ukraine through persistent force. One point that will be discussed is how Russia trusted in its powerful force and weapons without putting in real and detailed tactics. Moreover, underestimating your enemy is a classical mistake that Putin didn’t avoid. It isn’t always who is stronger in weapons but who is more intelligent in tactics. And despite its successes in different arenas like Syria and Chechnya, Russia didn’t put into consideration what Ukraine is capable of doing, or rather what capabilities the West would bring to Ukraine. One of the other important lessons from this battle will be the value of local initiative and delegated authority. For these methods to be successful, the author explains that the concerned military must be able to meet four requirements. First, there needs to be respect amongst people at the most senior and junior levels. Second, the combatants must have access to the tools and materials they require to continue fighting. Third, individuals providing leadership at the lowest levels of command must be of the highest caliber. Fourth, to function effectively at whatever level of command, one must be dedicated to the objective and comprehend its political purpose. The author believes these elements weren’t included in Putin’s strategic plan, who accordingly is having a challenge in directing people to act in favor of what they may see as a delusion. By: Sohaila Oraby, CIGA Research Intern

The Balance of Soft Power: The American and Chinese Quests to Win Hearts and Minds

Author: Maria Repnikova Affiliation: Georgia State University, College of Arts & Sciences. Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: July/August 2022/ NewYork, USA Type of Literature: Article Word Count: 3509 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-21/soft-power-balance-america- china?check_logged_in=1 Keywords: USA, China, Soft Power, Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy Brief: Maria Repnikova explores the concept of soft power by examining two distinct models: the American and the Chinese conceptions of it. In her discussion, she delves into the balance of soft power and the strategies each model uses to engage with the public. Repnikova argues that both the United States and China have developed distinct interpretations of soft power and unique modes of operation. While American soft power emphasizes the ideals and values of democracy and liberalism, following an ideational paradigm, China’s soft power adopts a practical paradigm to promote its cultural or commercial interests. While this Chinese model of soft power has not been widely accepted in the West, it has maintained a strong appeal to the “global south”. Interestingly, both American and Chinese models of soft power have been viewed by the international community as “complementary” rather than competitive. Repnikova begins by providing a comparative historical analysis of the evolution and development of American and Chinese soft power. In the case of the United States, Nye’s paradigm of soft power focuses on intangible resources such as culture, ideology, and the ability to shape international institutions. While soft power has been a part of American foreign policy since the 1990s, it has experienced ups and downs depending on shifts in administration. However, during this period, the concept of soft power has gained greater visibility and influence in American policy. On the other hand, China began to develop its model of soft power in 2007, as officials began to address soft power in publications and speeches as a way to cultivate cultural creativity and use it as a soft power tool. This has led to a surge of literature on the topic by Chinese scholars and a significant expansion of Chinese public diplomacy, including the establishment of media outlets and Confucius Institutes in nearly 162 countries worldwide. Maria Repnikova compares the fundamental principles of both models of soft power as they are seen as a point of competition between the two countries. The American conceptualization of soft power is largely based on an ideological orientation that emphasizes democratic values and ideals, positioning itself as a defender of democracy and liberalism against authoritarian powers such as Russia and China. American soft power and public diplomacy celebrate liberty, individualism, and diversity through showcasing such models and examples around the world. Additionally, American soft power is heavily influenced by the cultural export of the private sector, such as Hollywood movies and commercial brands. In other words, the American model of soft power projection combines the efforts of both the private and public sectors, a tradition that began during the Cold War and has continued since the post-Cold War era through the deployment of writers, artists, and musicians by the CIA and the State Department to promote certain cultural content and publication. In contrast, the Chinese perception and strategy of soft power emphasize pragmatism over values. China takes an economic-commercial approach to project its soft power and culture, using its economic development, increasing military power, technological advancement, and governing competence to enhance its global image and position. Through its international media outlets, China emphasizes these elements, along with material generosity, in an effort to build its image and soft power in the world. For example, China generously supports development projects in Central Asian countries in sectors such as public health and agriculture, and offers educational programs and training opportunities to countries in the global south. This examination of these two distinct models of soft power reveals that while the United States uses its soft power capabilities in an ideational and value-based paradigm to complement its hard power, China emphasizes its increasing hard power, whether economic or military, to bolster its soft power. In education, the United States leverages the prestige of its educational institutions as an elite destination, while China takes advantage of the availability of state-funded scholarships and low-tuition education compared to Western institutions to maintain its global image as a destination for students from the global south. From a Western perspective, it is argued that China compensates for its lack of ideational or ideological power through material incentives and the deployment of its economic power to attract people and build its image. At this point, Repnikova argues that although these economic incentives are not inherently soft power, they can sustain China’s soft power by enhancing its image as a global power that supports competence, pragmatism, and opportunity, particularly in places where these are scarce or unavailable. Repnikova argues that although Chinese soft power has had limited influence in the United States and other Western countries, it has gained more influence in the global south, particularly in Africa and Latin America. The Chinese pragmatic economic approach to soft power has had a positive impact on Africa in the economic and political spheres. For example, China offers a large number of educational and training opportunities and scholarships, compared to the limited number of highly competitive fellowships provided by the US State Department. Additionally, Chinese soft power has high visibility in the global south due to the increasing number of infrastructure projects, such as highways, bridges, and railways. While these projects have been controversial due to concerns about quality and safety, they have helped to maintain China’s image and position. However, this visibility and appeal of Chinese soft power and influence in the global south does not mean that the US-China competition in this region, and elsewhere, should be seen as a “zero-sum game”. Instead, the American and Chinese models of soft power are seen as complementary to each other and attractive to different publics in various regions. Targeted elites seek to maintain connections and benefit from opportunities offered by both China and the US. Repnikova discusses the future challenges facing American and Chinese soft power. For the American model of soft power, the main challenge is the gap between its proclaimed democratic values and its inconsistency in its domestic practices, which undermines its image as a defender of democracy and liberalism. Additionally, its selective commitment to supporting democracy abroad breeds mistrust and concerns about its intentions. Another challenge is that the US’s limited investments in human capital hinder its promotion of soft power. On the other hand, China’s reliance on material and practical incentives has led to quality issues with its image and perception, as seen in public perception of Chinese vaccines and the limited influence of its state media outlets. To address this challenge, China needs to shift its focus from quantity to quality and allow more freedom in its media outlets. Additionally, its reliance on economic incentives without ideational power may require it to offer more gifts, which will be more difficult if its economy slows down. To sum up, while it is often portrayed that the US and China are engaged in a soft power competition, it is more of a “soft power coexistence.” Rather than focusing on which model is more attractive, the focus is on what each can offer. Their success therefore depends not on outplaying or surpassing each other, but on addressing their own internal weaknesses. It is worth noting that the theory of soft power offers two different approaches: one that focuses on intangible power, represented by ideational power, and another that relies on incentives rather than punishment, represented by economic inducements. Both the American and Chinese models adopt different models of soft power. However, the goal is not to simply maintain soft power, but to use it to achieve specific objectives and goals, whether through hard or soft power, as it is primarily a tool, not an end in itself. The key is to use “smart power,” which involves choosing the right tool for the right situation based on one’s own capabilities and goals. In this regard, China’s capabilities align with its strategy due to the inferiority of its language and culture. It leverages its economic development and technological advancement to build its own model of soft power. As such, Chinese soft power should be seen as a potential that has maintained its status in international politics. By: Yomna Süleyman, CIGA Research Associate

Title: The Status Dilemma in World Politics: An Anatomy of the China– India Asymmetrical Rivalry

Author: Xiaoyu Pu Affiliation: Department of Political Science at University of Nevada Reno: Reno, NV, US Organization/Publisher: The Chinese Journal of International Politics Date/place: July 28, 2022/UK Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 19 Link: https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/15/3/227/6651149 Keywords: China-India Relations, Status Dilemma, Conflict of Interest, Asymmetrical Rivalry Brief: The purpose of Xiaoyu Pu’s study is to challenge the belief that the relationship between China and India is a zero-sum game. Instead, he argues that the status dilemma model can be used to better understand the dynamics of this relationship and other aspects of world politics. To support his argument, Pu compares the status dilemma model with the security dilemma and the status competition model. Through this comparison, he aims to provide a clearer understanding of the logic and mechanisms behind the status dilemma in world politics, and offer a different perspective on China-India relations. According to the author, the security dilemma is characterized by three main assumptions: an anarchical system, self-defense as the main motivation for states, and the tendency for military updates by one state to trigger similar updates in other states. This study, however, focuses specifically on the concept of status in world politics. The author defines status as a state’s beliefs about its ranking and value based on certain characteristics and qualities. It is important to note that the author differentiates between status and power, highlighting that status has more of a social and cultural meaning. Like the security dilemma, the status dilemma arises due to a lack of complete information or understanding about whether a state’s status is being challenged, leading to potential misunderstandings and conflicts. In his study, Xiaoyu Pu aims to show that the relationship between China and India is not a zero- sum game, meaning that the goals of these states may be compatible to some extent. To do this, he compares three different models of world politics – the security dilemma, the status competition model, and the status dilemma model – and highlights how the status dilemma model can provide insight into the root causes of international conflict. While the security dilemma focuses on security as the main factor driving conflict, the status competition model assumes that status is a scarce resource, making it a zero-sum game between states. The status dilemma model, on the other hand, suggests that international conflict arises from misunderstandings about what contributes to it, and that the competition for status may be overstated. The border conflict between China and India can be better understood in terms of conflicting interests rather than a focus on security, according to the author. Both countries have been vying for international status, with India particularly seeking to increase its power and status on the global stage. The author notes that India has expressed frustration with China’s reluctance to recognize India as a rising global power in international institutions, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United Nations Security Council. India perceives China’s obstruction of its membership in these organizations as an attempt to hinder India’s ambitions and diminish its status. According to Xiaoyu Pu, there are several reasons why India and China are competing for greater status in the South Asia region. Both countries possess hard and soft power that influences their competition, and they are also expanding their naval capabilities which could lead to naval competition. India is concerned about China’s efforts to strengthen its relationships with India’s neighbors, viewing it as a threat. Additionally, the balance of power in politics plays a role in the status competition between India and China. The author argues that the US’s accommodation of India is not only a matter of balancing power, but also of status. China sees the US’s actions as an attempt to limit China’s growth and establish an anti-China alliance in the region through its support of India and Prime Minister Modi’s strategy. According to the author, the status dilemma model tends to exaggerate the competitive nature of the status relationship and underestimate the potential compatibility of states’ status goals. The author suggests that China has no strategic desire to impede India’s rise on the global stage, and in fact, India’s rise aligns with China’s preference for a multipolar world. However, Indian elites perceive China as the only major power that does not accept India’s rise. Contrary to the belief that status is a scarce resource, the author of this article suggests that we are experiencing a proliferation of status abundance. The emergence of international clubs such as the Group of Twenty and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum illustrates that status can be seen as a club good, rather than a zero-sum game. While both China and India have cooperated in international clubs, their goals for international status within the UN system may be compatible to some extent. However, the author notes that rising powers may not always seek to increase their power, as it can be costly. Previous studies have assumed that India will always strive for greater recognition as a great power, but the author argues that India has actually protested being over-recognized due to its rise in the international system. In contrast, China is working towards great power status while trying to maintain its image as a developing country. Xiaoyu Pu identifies power asymmetry and motivated reasoning as two sources of mistrust and miscommunication between China and India. He points out that while India initiated economic liberalization in the 1990s, China began its reforms in the 1970s and has since become a much stronger economic power. China has also gained membership in various “great power clubs” and has even established new international institutions. This difference in growth between the two countries has resulted in a power asymmetry and has led China to view India as less of a threat, while causing India to be more sensitive to Chinese actions. The author argues that both countries have succumbed to misperception, with Indian officials interpreting every Chinese action as motivated by zero-sum thinking, and China perceiving India’s partnership with the US an attempt to resist and obstruct China’s rise. Another example cited by the author is India’s failure to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which India attributes to China’s efforts to hinder its rise, while the author asserts that China’s opposition to India’s membership in the NSG was driven by concerns about its criteria. The concept of motivated reasoning – the idea that people’s motivations shape their evaluation of information – may also contribute to misperception between the two countries, as states may not objectively assess threats or opportunities in the international arena. According to the author, China’s perception of India is generally more negative than India’s perception of China. However, the author repeatedly emphasizes the potential for a non-zero-sum-game relationship between the two countries. While the author suggests that China does not view India as a threat, misperception and mistrust contribute to the ongoing conflict between them. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern

The Geopolitical Foundation for U.S. Strategy in a New U.S.-China Bipolar System

Authors: Jo Inge Bekkevold & Øystein Tunsjø Affiliation: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, Oslo, Norway Organization/Publisher: China International Strategy Review Date/Place: June 28, 2022/ China Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 16 Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00109-y Keywords: China, US Strategy, Bipolarity, Geopolitics, Rimland Brief: International politics has entered a new era of bipolarity with the rise of China, which has challenged the hegemony of the United States. Currently, no other state has the combined power of the US and China. However, the authors of this article argue that the return of bipolarity and the competition between the US and China will not lead to a new Cold War-style containment. The geopolitical factors shaping the current great power competition are different from those during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US employed four containment strategies to contain the Soviet Union: perimeter defense in the Eurasian rimlands, consolidated threat assessment with US allies, playing the “China card” against the Soviet Union, and economic containment efforts. However, these strategies are not compatible with containing China due to China’s geostrategic location. In this article, the authors review the US containment strategy during the Cold War and examine the incompatibility of those strategies against China in the current great power competition. The authors present the heartland and rimland thesis by Mackinder and Spykman to explain why the current US-China bipolar system differs from the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US was able to contain the Soviet Union’s heartland by building alliances with the Eurasian rimlands. According to Spykman, securing the rimlands was essential due to their wealth, demographics, military-industrial potential, and most importantly, their easier access to the sea. Thus, Spykman argued that the United States should be present in the rimlands to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, with the rise of China, located in the rimlands, another geopolitical dynamic with different actors has emerged, presenting a unique challenge for the United States. In this regard, the authors argue that the current bipolar system is characterized by less intense balancing, a less intense arms race, and less polarization, but it is also less stable and more prone to conflict. The Truman administration conceptualized two balancing strategies in the early days of the Cold War: strongpoint defense and perimeter defense. Strongpoint defense involves building alliances only with the leading economic powers around the enemy, while perimeter defense involves committing to support all states in the enemy’s perimeter without distinction. During the Cold War, the US supported all of the Eurasian rimlands around the Soviet perimeter. However, it is impossible to implement perimeter defense against China in the current bipolar system. This is because China is located in the rimland and controls the East Asian mainlands. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was free from a significant land-based threat and enjoyed relatively safe neighbors. Beijing has capitalized on this situation by focusing its resources on building sea power. Therefore, the authors argue that China’s geostrategic location compels the US to implement only strongpoint defense by building alliances with economic powers such as India, Japan, and South Korea. Furthermore, during the Cold War, the US was able to optimize a two-flank threat against the Soviet Union by pushing Russia from Europe and East Asia. However, China already controls the East Asian rimlands, meaning that China only has one flank to defend, across the transpacific region. This situation pushes the US to prioritize its transpacific flank, leaving Washington less focused on transatlantic affairs. At the same time, European allies are unlikely to support the US in containing China while they are busy with the Russian threat and economically tied to China. During the Cold War, Washington was able to play the “China card” against the Soviet Union. This was possible due to the fact that China and the Soviet Union were enemies on the brink of war, as demonstrated by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict and Nixon’s visit to Beijing. However, the opportunity for the US to play the “Russia card” against China is difficult, if not impossible, due to several reasons. First, the Ukrainian conflict has compelled the US to side with European blocs against Russia. Second, Moscow and Beijing are in a very different relationship than they were 50 years ago, and in fact, they currently enjoy a closer relationship than at any time in history. Beijing’s focus on maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region shows that China is more concerned with the transatlantic flank and enjoys a safe neighbor in Russia. Similarly, Russia is more concerned with Europe than with considering China as a threat. The authors suggest that a shift in US-Russia relations against China is unlikely, unless Beijing turns its assertiveness towards Moscow. The international economic order during the Cold War was characterized by a highly polarized two-bloc economic order, but this is not the case in the current bipolar order. Again, China’s possession of rimland power makes it different in these two scenarios. First, China’s rimland position has helped it expand global trade and interdependence with global actors, slowing down the polarization of the economic order. China has been successful in establishing a large network of economic interdependence overseas, not only through land-based trade, but also through its strong presence in sea-based trade routes. Second, China’s attachment to the European economy represents a one-flank challenge for Beijing. Since European countries are deeply connected to China in economic terms, it is difficult for them to decouple from the Chinese economy and support US economic containment against Beijing. Additionally, the effects of rapid globalization will prevent the polarization of the international economic order. In conclusion, it is the geopolitics that differentiate the bipolar system of the Cold War and the US- China rivalry. While it appears that high polarization is unlikely to occur in the current bipolar system, the rivalry between the US and China may be more prone to conflict and more unstable. By: Salman Nugraha, CIGA Research Intern

Does the EU Need Treaty Change?

Author: Stefan Lehne Affiliation: Visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe; Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs (2009-2011); General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2002-2008, director for the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia) Organization/Publisher: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Date/place: June 16, 2022 / Belgium Type of Literature: Article Word Count: 3032 Link: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/16/does-eu-need-treaty-change-pub-87330 Keywords: EU, Conference on the Future of Europe, European Parliament, Lisbon Treaty, ECR Group Brief: The Conference on the Future of Europe concluded in May and the author illustrates the different views on whether the EU should perform reforms through treaty change or continue to rely on improvised responses to upcoming challenges. The European Parliament argues to carry out and apply the recommended new legislation through treaty changes, and a constitutional convention similar to those in 2002-2003 should be integrated. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers wants to evade reform that would be hard to control. The European Commission stresses citizens’ panels and the digital platform as ways for them to participate and deliberate on topics such as health, social policy, migration, and foreign policy. Various recommendations would necessitate modifications of the EU treaty. However, representatives of the European Conservatives and Reformists (the ECR Group) protested about a pro-EU bias, and walked out of the conference. 13 governments have published a letter opposing the ideas of change and arguing that the EU can achieve changes through the existing treaty. Another six countries followed with another letter in which they assert themselves as open to the idea of treaty changes. Thus, arriving at a solution will not be an easy task. Some EU leaders acknowledge that the Lisbon Treaty has its own flaws and sooner or later would have to be changed. However, the EU has been preoccupied with many crises and events, from the pandemic to the mass influx of refugees with the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The European Parliament (which advocates for changes) suggests inserting special clauses in the treaty to encourage the commission to act in emergencies. But skeptics doubt whether the political conditions are sufficient to justify changing the treaty; why risk failure when past crises were managed without changes. The author argues that it is feasible that changes through improvisation will remain the conventional method of EU development. Geopolitical challenges are bound to take place and it is dubious whether EU decision-makers will engage in an agreement on treaty reform. Nevertheless, modifying the treaties could aid the EU in confronting upcoming challenges. Even if a modest reform took place, it would encourage more alterations to the treaty. In an era defined by multiple crises, the EU will have to add and change policies caused by pressures of astute emergencies. Critical Commentary: The author explains the stance that the three institutions in the Convention on the Future of Europe have towards changing the existing EU treaty. While the European Parliament strongly advocates for change, the Council of Ministers does not. The author focuses on the crises that the EU has gone through, from the economic crisis in 2008-2009 until the pandemic, and lastly the Russian aggression against Ukraine. All are events that have challenged Europe’s policies and have proved challenging. Advocates for treaty change have seen recommendations presented by the citizens’ panel as an indication of a need for modification. While groups that oppose changes have argued that past challenges and events indicate that the EU can go on without a reform of the treaty. This, in the opinion of the author, is a controversial aspect of the conference. The author believes that an agreement among decision-makers on the issue of treaty change is not something that can be expected, and he argues that a modification of the treaty could risk creating an ideological division among those who support a federalist EU and those who defend national sovereignty. By: Sara El Souhagy, CIGA Research Intern

Xi Jinping and Ideology

Author: Joseph Torigian Affiliation: School of International Service, American University (Washington, DC, USA) Organization/Publisher: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States/Wilson Center Date/Place: June 14, 2022/Washington, DC, USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Number of Pages: 32 Link: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/xi-jinping-and-ideology Keywords: China, Ideology, Xi Jinping, Xi Zhongxun, Radicalism, Conviction, Values, Chinese Communist Party, US Rivalry Brief: Acknowledging how scholars differently explain what “ideology” stands for—like whether someone’s political views are cohesive and a tool used to explain, repress, integrate, motivate, or legitimate—the author traces Chinese President Xi Jinping’s evolution as the Chinese Communist Party’s chief. While Xi has advised against a “dogmatic, extremist” approach to policy, the author looks at Xi’s past through his father Xi Zhongxun and why the two-time Chinese president has followed a policy of “caution about taking steps beyond what the situation allows.” Xi’s life and work reveal why he has instead focused on values and motivation. “A loss of confidence in the CCP’s mission,” the author notes, pointing to Xi’s concept, “would mean the loss of the party’s political spirit and the spiritual pillar for CCP members to withstand any test.” Drawing from many theories and concepts on what constitutes “ideology”, including that “ideas and interests could not be divorced from one another” and “how a leader is exposed to ideas is itself necessarily a political process,” the author argues that “characteristic” of a totalitarian regime is an “elaborate ideology bent on societal transformation and world domination.” He explains that just as there was a “return of ideology” in Soviet studies after the end of the Cold War, in which scholars incorrectly concluded that “ideology was the cornerstone that could elucidate all of Soviet history,” outside observers today have likewise “misjudged the role of ideology in elite (Chinese) politics.” “The political successions in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao Zedong are often explained as triumphs of inner-party democracy, leading to a victory of ‘reformers’ over ‘conservatives’ or ‘radicals’,” the author argues. However, new evidence shows that the “post-cult-of-personality power struggles were instead shaped by the politics of personal prestige, historical antagonisms, backhanded political maneuvering, and violence.” Referring to official histories of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP, the author notes how they tend to “define their past as a series of ‘line struggles’ in which rightists or leftists are defeated.” While many argue that Xi has demonstrated as being leftist, which contradicts his father’s commitment of having “never committed a mistake of being leftist,” the author quotes a former CCP official who asserts: “He is his father’s son; he was born into the family of the most proreform faction; according to the inheritance of CCP and Chinese history, he cannot betray the faction that includes his father…He is the egg laid by his father, the egg of reform…[Xi Zhongxun] was not a typical reformer; he was the greatest reformer; if you use color to categorize, and the reformists were blue, then he was deep blue.” Xi’s launch of special economic zones demonstrates his being “reformist” while he has insisted on “more institutionalization within the party and protection for different opinions.” At a time when China is condemned by all for its persecuting ethnic Uyghurs in northwestern Xinjiang province, the author however notes that Xi has often “revealed a ‘softer’ side with regard to Beijing’s policies toward ethnic minorities.” “The broader context in which Xi lived helps us see both the power and limitations of ideology as an explanation in specific ways,” the author says. Within the party, the author reveals how the CCP has molded into a more disciplined one where deputies demonstrate Leninist characteristics who “usually care more about discipline and party stability than pushing for their own policies.” Power within the party, the author argues, flows from top to bottom. “Mobilizing a ‘faction’ with any ideological cohesion is taboo.” Thus, the author insists, party discipline has “restrained policy inclinations Xi might have held” as “the party’s interests come first.” The author finds almost no evidence that would suggest that Xi spoke, criticized or acted against any party campaign that went “too far”, as “significant levels of violence, persecution, and wrongful verdicts” have been committed under his responsibility, which policies he didn’t criticize “ until he had a clear sense of which way the wind was blowing.” Instead of “always” pushing for “particularly aggressive policies,” Xi has instead “worked hard to address mistakes once they were identified.” The author disagrees that Xi has completely “escaped the party’s ‘leftist mistakes’.” In his academic probe, the author finds an interesting behavior among the CCP cadre: many conflicting approaches in the same individual. It reveals that it is highly unlikely that a CCP member will hold the same position on two different issues, and one would make a poor prediction for “how they might react in other situations.” Despite sharing the same ideological inclinations, the CCP members have to address “concrete challenges of any particular goal.” The study finds that the CCP leaders pursue “multiple goals simultaneously, and such objectives may conflict with one another.” During his time as a foot soldier in the CCP, Xi has likewise “had to manage an extraordinary set of different challenges.” Pointing to conflicting approaches in Xi, the author identifies that while he has supported the Special Economic Zones in one province, Xi has yet “opposed the household responsibility system, which gave more rights to peasants and was an even more important step in China’s economic restructuring.” This behavior displays “a wide variety of approaches that together do not fit well on a ‘rightist-leftist’ spectrum.” The author also draws attention to Xi’s different approaches to settling challenges in Xinjiang during the 1980s and his tougher behavior with Catholics. With age, Xi has also reformed himself and urged reforms in the party’s policies. The author suggests that the violence which has erupted in Muslim regions of China was largely due to the CCP policies—Xi acknowledged it and advocated reforms. Xi had to correct himself about why common Chinese were rushing to then British-colonized Hong Kong. When he was told economic stress was the issue, “He gradually came to understand that the problem was indeed economic and that the PRC (People’s Republic of China) needed to provide more concrete benefits to convince peasants to stay,” the author says about Xi’s time in Guangdong province which borders the semi-autonomous Hong Kong region. From his review of the Chinese president’s articles and speeches, the author believes Xi has avoided “extremes.” Despite his insistence on professing socialist characteristics of the Chinese economy, Xi has regularly “identified both the benefits and challenges brought by marketization of the Chinese economy.” After examining the press of the 1980s, the author explains Xi’s modus operandi, that he “has always displayed a belief in the importance of ideals and motivation.” “Here, you don’t hear everyone shouting reform, but reform is everywhere,” the local publication China Youth wrote, describing Xi as a “man without sharp elbows whose main focus was practicality and results, not reform for reform’s sake.” “ He is a reformer who does not wear western-style clothes, and he forges ahead without acting aggressively. While persuading people to accept the historical necessity of reform, he can still leisurely have a drink of alcohol. This is a reformer who makes progress with a smile on his face,” the publication added. The author concludes that Xi has been “walking both a sort of middle path and new path.” Xi, however, warns against “money worship, hedonism, ultra-individualism, and historical nihilism.” By: Riyaz ul Khaliq, CIGA Non-resident Research Associate

Why Do People Hate Realism So Much?

Author: Stephen M. Walt Affiliation: Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Organization/Publisher: Foreign Policy Date/Place: June 13, 2022/USA Type of Literature: Analysis Word Count: 2015 Link: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/13/why-do-people-hate-realism-so-much/ Keywords: Realism, Realist, Hawkish Foreign Policy, New World Order Brief: Although realism and realists were the ones who repeatedly warned about the Russia-Ukraine conflict before it happened, the author discusses why realism has been an unpopular and uncomfortable topic among foreign policy experts and politicians. Because realism, more than any other school, analyzes the world for what it is—not the way we want it to be—it ignores the ideological labeling, and sees that conflicts between states or individuals cannot be solved permanently and that there must be an overarching central authority to enforce agreements and prevent state attacks, a proposition which isn’t possible for some people. Realists don’t see the globe as a division between “good” and “bad”, and so it sees that even the best democratic countries will do terrible things if they feel that their interests and goals are in danger (for example: what the Johnson administration did when it was worried that South Vietnam would become part of the communist world in the 1960s). The author defends against the accusation that realists have no moral or ethical consideration, identifying proponents whose motivations to act were grounded in morality despite their foreign policy forecasts being built on the realist framework. But realism also knows that all countries compete with each other for safety and security in a flawed world. Finally, realism isn’t popular in the US because it doesn’t accept the belief of American exceptionalism— that the US alone is moral and always acts for the good of humanity. Accordingly, all of these elements have led to many debates and disagreements on trusting realism or even following it. Realists see diplomacy and compromise as critical tools for resolving differences without the use of military force, in contrast to the idealistic liberals who blame all problems on evil leaders and propose that the only solution is to eliminate them—a policy that tends to get a lot of people killed and lead to wider conflict. In the end, realism is unpopular because its proponents keep forecasting things correctly, and accurately calling out governments for their bad behavior. By: Sohaila Oraby, CIGA Research Intern

To Intervene or Not to Intervene

Author: Hans J. Morgenthau Affiliation: German-American Political Scientist and Historian (1904, Coburg, Germany—died July 19, 1980, New York, USA); Professor of Political Science and Modern History and Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago; Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (1966); academic interpreter of U.S. foreign policy Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: April 1967/Republished June 2022 Type of Literature: Historical Journal Article Word Count: 5693 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1967-04-01/intervene-or-not-intervene Keywords: Realism, Russia, Ukraine, USA, Vietnam, Economic Aid Brief: The Council on Foreign Relations made this article available to the public for the first time in 1967. The most well-known thing associated with Morgenthau is his six principles of realism theory, which places an emphasis on the role of security as the major driver of ‘conflict.’ Considering Russia’s continuous involvement in Ukraine, a new version of the text has been published in 2022. Despite its age and unfortunate inclusion of blatantly racist ideology, the article however remains relevant and is thought to be significant since it provides an answer to one of the most fundamental concerns—why nations act. The investigation conducted by Morgenthau reveals several significant differences between the many attempts made in the past and in the present to intervene. To begin, post-colonized nations do not fulfill all the conditions necessary to be recognized as nations. Because of this, the government of that country looks to other countries and organizations for financial aid. To illustrate his theory that “aid” is the basic driving factor behind interventions, Morgenthau conducts an analysis of the economies of India and Egypt, both of which have historically relied on international assistance. The hypothesis proposed by Morgenthau states that the nation that aids another country holds the power to determine the fate of the country that receives the assistance. Even if another nation’s government offers assistance, the United States will still take action; alternatively, if it does not, the major powers will still take action.It is unavoidable that a government will be susceptible to the political demands of the nation that is providing assistance if the basic existence of the government is dependent on assistance from another nation. Second, the world as we know it today is not all that dissimilar to the reality that existed during the Napoleonic wars, which was a time where the idea of nonintervention and the practice of war coexisted. This brings up an interesting point. The most powerful nations in the world are optimistic about the positive outcomes that could result from a successful revolution, but they are wary of the potential drawbacks that could be brought on by revolutionary upheaval. After this, the primary powers of the globe reached a consensus to join the revolution and lend their support to the many groups that are fighting for their cause. As a consequence of this, none of the revolutions that took place after World War II had any effect whatsoever on the nation’s very own foreign policy; but, they did shed light on the political group to which each nation belongs. In the year 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union are in a state that can be compared to “mutual cohabitation,” and they have made a pact to stay out of each other’s way. Both sides now consider the rest of the world to be their battleground, and they prefer to engage in the conflict via a third party so that they can avoid engaging in direct violence. They have either supported or opposed the administrations of less powerful nations in order to achieve their interests while simultaneously intervening in the internal affairs of the states that make up those nations. The struggle between various political ideologies and long-standing animosities constitutes the fourth component of the intervention. The United States and the Soviet Union squared up against one another in the international arena not only as two superpowers, but also as the creators of two opposing and incompatible philosophies, forms of government, and ways of life. This competition took place during the Cold War. This is the impetus that motivates these two nations to take action and further develop their connection with one another. “The choice of countries” determines whether such governments will become customers of blocs or continue to operate freely. This occurs while the two superpowers work out how to exert influence over less powerful states. If this reading of our intervention policy is right, then the United States has successfully interfered in a way that is both wise and effective. Their policy of involvement has been shaped by the United States’ ideological aversion to communism and potential uprisings led by communists, and this aversion has impacted their policy. This unfortunate encounter with defeat should prove to be an extremely valuable learning opportunity for the United States. The United States has spent significantly more than $100 billion intervening in the political, military, and economic affairs of other nations, and it is currently engaged in a costly and complicated war to construct a nation in South Vietnam. The United States has also spent a significant amount of time and resources on this war. Only America’s adversaries would dare to turn their backs on the unrivaled generosity of these initiatives, which have no previous example in human history. But were these strategies the best option? Have the commitments made, and the risks taken been appropriate considering what was expected and what transpired? And did they succeed, in fact? The economic assistance provided by the United States has been effective in bolstering economies that were already amid the development process. On the other hand, the assistance has largely been unsuccessful in establishing economic development in areas where none existed before. As a result of this failure, the United States has developed the conceptual idea of concentrating aid on the few nations that are able to make use of it, as opposed to providing aid to the many nations who need it. This principle of selectivity is sound in theory; however, its consistent application in practice has been thwarted by harsh political and military realities, which may necessitate the provision of economic aid that is not economically justified. In addition, its consistent application is difficult due to considerations derived from the ideological concerns that were discussed earlier. The concept of exercising judgment must likewise be applied to the worlds of politics and the armed forces. The United States currently has a tremendously exaggerated view of what may be achieved for the benefit of another nation through participation in the affairs of that nation. The boundless ideological commitment inevitably results in this consequence, which is an overestimation of the ability to act. It is not going to be based on broad ideological commitments or an unquestioning dependence on American strength; rather, the selection of these occasions will be determined after carefully considering the interests involved and the power that is available. If the United States adheres to this norm, it will be necessary for it to intervene less and will lead to greater levels of success. By: Maryam Khan, CIGA Research Associate

The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis

Author: John J. Mearsheimer Affiliation: Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Organization/Publisher: The National Interest Date/Place: June 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Speech given at the European University Institute Word Count: 5984 Link: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-crisis-203182 Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO Expansion, Provocation, Monroe Doctrine, Soviet Borders, Proxy War Brief: During a recent speech, distinguished professor John J. Mearsheimer highlighted and compared two wars that he has seen in his lifetime, the Vietnam War and the ongoing Ukraine War. The author says that in both wars the United States miscalculated, and with this speech he wants to shed light on the events that have taken place to clarify the true reasoning behind the war, especially if it is a failure. He builds his analysis through historical facts and their indications, explaining why it was a misstep and how one should read the current situation without being influenced by western countries’ reasoning led by the US. Mearsheimer addresses two elements regarding the war in Ukraine. Primarily, he sees the US as the main actor that should be held accountable for starting the war by its pushing policies regarding Ukraine joining NATO—which Russia sees as an existential threat, and has repeatedly warned against for many years. Even though Russia is viewed as having started the war through its invasion, it was however the US that provoked Russia to lead its war in the Ukraine. Secondly, after the invasion by Russia, the US and its allies—after being pressured by the US—expanded sanctions to weaken Russia, disregarding any diplomatic efforts which were never the intention. Furthermore, despite the scale of damage in the Ukraine so far as a result of western-funded escalations and its continuing flow of arms, there is still a possibility for NATO to get into the war, hence the nuclear force could be implemented in the long term. Since the war started, the mainstream media has repeatedly said that Putin’s initial purpose to invade Ukraine is his dream of having Great Russia, as the Soviet Union. However, the author suggests that regardless of such implications, there is a great lack of evidence that would support this goal. Putin sees Russians and Ukrainians as one people with a common history, however, in one of his public speeches he also stated: “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” Putin in his public engagements seems to highlight that the Bolsheviks created Ukraine and expects his counterparts to acknowledge the fact. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that he follows a goal that he himself doesn’t think is feasible. In fact, Putin very much likes to see Ukraine as an independent state, and in his article on July 12, 2021 he states that Russia respects it. When he announced on February 24, 2021 that Russia would invade Ukraine, he again made it clear that even though he respects Ukraine’s sovereignty he cannot accept the threat of the US’ presence and its influence within its borders. The historical record shows that Putin never lied about his foreign policy as is claimed; on the contrary, occasionally he stressed that he primarily concerns himself with Ukraine’s relationship with the West and NATO. Additionally, Russia’s restraint in its military tactics by limiting itself to ‘aim strategy’ rather than bombardment also proves that Putin has no intention to conquer Ukraine, but wants to threaten Kyiv. Putin is very much aware of the challenges of having occupied states, given the Soviet Union’s experience. When he was invited to the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2014, he strongly argued the opinions of the alliance regarding the entrance of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, up until the Crimea crisis which happened as a spontaneous decision after the far-right in Kyiv protested and overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych. It was after this that Washington and its Western allies started portraying Putin as a hostile figure with imperial purposes in the region, who must be held under control. However, the author describes the crisis as an American-led effort to integrate Ukraine into NATO, to sustain pro-Western liberal democracy and have a reliable pro-Western ally within Russian borders. The forced integration started when the Alliance announced Ukraine and Georgia to become members in 2008. Despite the politicians’ briefs and their analyses which considered the policy as a direct challenge for Russia, the Bush administration proceeded further, disregarding both Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s opposition. The result was a war between Georgia and Russia. From then on, the Alliance continued supporting Ukraine’s integration into NATO, not only sending defensive weapons but training Ukrainian soldiers too; this has also included annual military exercises with NATO forces. While the Alliance advanced Ukraine’s military forces, there was a shift in political objectives in 2021 by Zelensky who didn’t seem willing to enter NATO when first elected, but he suddenly instructed hostile implementations towards Moscow, closing the pro-Russian TV channels and sentencing Putin’s close friend for treason. Zelensky’s political change of the discourse was empowered by the document that was signed between Biden and Zelensky which consists of a strategic partnership alongside the reiteration of the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration. In response, Putin wanted an assurance from the Biden administration that would guarantee Ukraine to not join NATO, not positioning any defensive weapons within Russian borders, and that NATO troops and their weapons move back to Western Europe. Putin repeatedly stated that he sees it as a threat on the doorstep of his house. After going through all diplomatic strategies, Putin had failed to get a peaceful resolution from the West. Meanwhile, America still pursues its Monroe Doctrinal policies of not allowing any distant power to have their military forces in its Western hemisphere, despite its disregard of the Russian hemisphere. The author concludes by laying down the current situation in Ukraine and speculates what likely will happen in the foreseeable future. 70% of Ukraine’s territory has been captured and sustained by Russia. The global economy has dramatically declined and the World Bank estimates that 50% of Ukraine’s economy will be withered by the end of 2022 since its exports have already stagnated. Over 6 million people have fled the country and 8 million are displaced internally. Ukraine currently needs $5 billion in monthly aid to run the government; and, all these events have happened in only four months. Mearsheimer suggests that the war will not end anytime soon, since both actors on the scene are quite determined to win. Additionally, none of them are willing to compromise from their perspectives. For Russia, Ukraine must be a neutral, non-Western state. But this is not agreeable to the Biden administration. On the other hand, given the overwhelming number of ultranationalists within the Ukraine and their supporters from NATO countries (especially Poland and the Baltic states), it is not safe for Russia to give up the territory it holds, nor the Ukrainians to be content with what Russia has taken so far. Finally, the war may escalate to an extent that NATO allies may be involved, and nuclear weapons may be employed. Because Russia considers this as an existential threat, it has no other choice but to win. For Biden, his administration’s goal is to weaken Russia in every term so that there will be no power left to invade Ukraine again. Failures in the war may result in a great- power nuclear war since none of them can afford to be defeated. Alongside the economic damages that the war has so far caused globally, conditions will further deteriorate. To conclude, it is not challenging to see who the real perpetrators are who started the war. Even though the architect was the Bush Administration, Obama, Trump, and Biden followed his footsteps and have pressured allies to their side. “The tragic truth is that if the West had not pursued NATO expansion into Ukraine, it is unlikely there would be a war in Ukraine today and Crimea would still be part of Ukraine. In essence, Washington played the central role in leading Ukraine down the path to destruction. History will judge the United States and its allies harshly for their remarkably foolish policy on Ukraine.” By: Cemile Cengiz, CIGA Research Assistant

The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine

Authors: :Tanisha M. Fazal Affiliation: Political Science professor at Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota Organization/Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: May-June, 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Journal Article Word Count: 3604 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/ukraine-russia-war-return-conquest Keywords: Ukrainian War, Geography, Norms against Territorial Conquest, State Death, the Future of Global Order Brief: The author argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a decisive test of norms against the territorial conquest of other countries by force and changing the borders—a tradition that was established in the international order after the end of the Second World War. This prevailing norm, which preaches the sacredness of borders and maximizing their importance, has prevented the swallowing-up of the weakest countries, especially those geographically adjacent to the major powers. The Russian invasion of Ukraine revives the ancient law of acquisition by conquest and threatens the future stability of the international system if the global community does not strictly move against it. It forebodes the extinction of more states from the world map and the changing of borders. The article is based on the author’s book published in 2007, entitled: “State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation.” The article is divided into four parts. The first part explains the phenomenon of “state death” in history, defining its reasons and tracing its steady decline since the early twentieth century. State death expresses the formal loss of control over foreign policy to another state after submitting to the latter, and the inability to act independently on the world stage. At the beginning of the modern state era, the reason behind state death was mainly the blunt force trauma that a country may be exposed to from another. Between 1816 and 1945, countries were disappearing from the world map because of this trauma every three years, on average. The countries located between the competitors were more likely to be seized. For instance, Poland was carved up by its surrounding strong powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) between 1772 – 1795, and it completely disappeared from the map of Europe for more than a century. In addition to the unfortunate geographical location of such countries, the author determines other reasons for the state’s death including its lack of strong diplomatic relations with the colonial powers. The “strong” trade relations conducted by many countries in Africa and Asia with the colonial powers were not sufficient for their survival. Here, the author compares those countries to others in the Middle East and Latin America that established strong diplomatic relations with colonial powers that helped them to keep their survival. Since the early twentieth century, this phenomenon has known a remarkable decline. The emergence of the United States as a great power—that had completed its invasion of lands in the American continent—contributed to the decline in the “death of state”, in addition to President Wilson’s 14 principles that were promoted during his era and after, especially the selfdetermination and defense of the territorial integrity, despite the US’ double standard in its use of these principles. In addition, the horrific events of the Second World War contributed to restraining states from territorial-conquest behavior in the post-war era

Nagorno- Karabakh in the Shadow of Ukraine

Author: Thomas de Waal Affiliation: Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe Organization /Publisher: Foreign Affairs Date/Place: May 30, 2022/ USA Type of Literature: Article Word Count: 2500 Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/armenia/2022-05-30/nagorno-karabakh-shadow-ukraine Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, EU, Peace Talk Brief: The article discusses the impact of Russia’s war with Ukraine on the peace talks of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. The author argues that Russia’s centrality to any settlement of this conflict —in what it sees as its backyard—is in doubt. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan are making progress on two major issues in the peace talks under the auspices of the EU: 1) the reopening of transport routes across closed borders, and 2) the demarcation of the official border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A core issue of the conflict since 1988 is the future status of the Armenian population of Karabakh. But intense wrangling continues even on the terms of the debate. Although the EU has supplanted Russia as a major mediator due to the setback in Ukraine, the diminished Russian role has caused instability. It also allows Armenia and Azerbaijan to work toward it if they wish to seize a definitive and historic peace settlement. Azerbaijan feels confident because European officials have substituted Russian energy supplies with Azerbaijani gas. The author concludes with the general perception from Azerbaijan’s side, that it is possible to solve the conflict by using those tactics again—and forcing the Armenian population to leave Karabakh. It might even succeed, but this would undoubtedly lead to a new cycle of violence and deepening resentment in Armenia. Nevertheless, the mediating role of the EU gives some space to pursue a peace deal that could quickly unravel the unstable geopolitical environment. By: Razia Wadood, CIGA Senior Research Associate